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Unless otherwise stated, my Greek texts for the Gorgias and other Greek works are
the Loeb Classical Library editions. Translations are taken from the Loeb texts;
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Greek words are transliterated according to accepted conventions. As an aid to
readers vmfamiliar with ancient Greek, when I use a Greek word I normally
transliterate the form listed in the Liddell and Scott lexicon. I use the Latinized
version of Greek proper names if the Latinized version is more familiar to most
readers (e.g., Socrates). Long vowels in all Greek words except proper names are
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L&S Liddell and Scott Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon (1994impression
of 1889 edition)
NE Nicomachean Ethics (Aristode)
Od. Odyssey (Homer)
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The major themes of the Gorgias. according to E. R. Dodds, are the nature
of rhetoric and the nature of the good life, or eudaimonia (Gorgias 1-3).^ These
two themes are closely related because the discussion of the good life is, in part,
an examination of the value of the political life —which in ancient Greece was
s3aion5mious with rhetoric —versus the value of the philosophical life. As with
many Platonic dialogues, however, these general themes allow Plato to employ
other, related motifs which support the main structure of the work. In the
Gorgias, one of these motifs is philia, a Greek word usually translated as
"friendship" or "love." The importance of philia in the Gorgias may not be
immediately obvious since Plato produced other dialogues, notably the Lvsis,
which treat the concept more openly; moreover, there are but two brief sections
of the Gorgias which deal with the concept explicitly: 507d7-508a5, where Socrates
emphasizes the importance of justice and temperance to friendship, and 510b4-
513c4, where Socrates and Callicles discuss the friendships (or lack of them) of the
despot or intemperate person. Nevertheless, Howard J. Curzer is correct in
asserting that the reference to friendship starting at 507d7 "does not introduce the
issue of friendship ... but rather continues a discussion about friendship that is
already imderway" (157). Curzer himself gives little evidence for his assertion
(the main subject of his article is temperance), but it is a reasonable claim, given
the hints which Plato drops in the preceding sections of the dialogue:
Chaerephon, in the prologue, claims to be a friend ofGorgias (447b3); Gorgias,
^Hereafter, E. R. Dodds' translation of and commentary onPlato's Gorgias will bereferred to
simplyas 'T)odds." The singledtation 'T)odds,Greeks" (p.31) refers toDodds' TheGreeksand the
Irrational.
through an analogy to combat sports, advises Socrates that rhetoric should be
used for helping friends and harming enemies (456dl-c4); Socrates proclaims
himself a friend to Polus (470cl0-ll, 473a3); Callicles states that he is "fairly
friendly" to Socrates (485e2); and included in the theme of eudaimonia is the
idea of being a philosophos, a lover of wisdom. Moreover, the Greek concept of
friendship, as Mary Whitlock Blundell describes it, "involves a general
requirement of reciprocal help and benefit" (32), and terms of help and benefit
meet one at every, turn of the Gorgias. Apallassd (458a9), boetheo (483b3),
didkoned (521al0), euergetes (506c2), therapeia (517e6), charis (462c8), charizomai
(462cl0); all of these terms either denote or imply relief, help, care, assistance,
favor, or service of various kinds to another human being. It seems clear, then,
that the Gorgias considers some aspect of philia which is related to the two main
themes of rhetoric and eudaimonia.
It is my intention to trace Plato's treatment of one aspect of philia in the
Gorgias —its relationship to both rhetoric and philosophy —by choosing one of
the above "terms of assistance" and following it through the dialogue. My term
of choice is charis and its cognates. Like the meanings of such Greeks terms as
logos and kairos, the meaning of chans is not easily delimited. Mary Scott calls
the term "clearly untranslatable into English" but suggests that it involves both
"the feeling of pleasure itself and the appearance, feature or quality which
produces this pleasure" (2). At its deepest etymological level, charis does mean
something like "pleasure," but in contrast to hedoni, a more general Greek word
for pleasure often limited to a strictly individual response, charis implies the joy
foimd in social exchange and interaction. According to Gregory Nagy, for
example, the word "conveys simultaneously the social aspect of reciprocity as
well as the personal aspect of pleasure " (37 nl3.2, emphasis his). Bonnie
MacLachlan concurs that ''charis- pleasure was not private: It entailed enjoyment
fiiat was mutual, redprocal" (5). Because charis is a social, reciprocal pleasure, it
is intimately tied to the concept of philia, so much so that Blundell calls charis
"fundamental to philia and the personal and social relations it governs" (33).
Philia itself covers a range of relationships wider than our English word
"friendship," extending from the relationship of human beings with the gods,
through the intimate personal affection of family and friends, to the fellowship
of citizens in a polis. 2 As Chapter One will demonstrate, charis is a part of all
these different kinds of friendship, including erotic friendships, where the
special charis of beauty provides the impetus for amorous pursuit. In
consummated erotic relationships, moreover, including but not limited to
marriage, sexual intercourse or gratification provides a special kind of charis-
pleasure which helps unite the couple in philia. As the dialogue unfolds, it
becomes apparent that we are speaking primarily of charis as it relates to political
friendship versus philosophical friendship. Nevertheless, I will show how Plato
uses other t5^es of charis to develop his larger themes.
It may seem needlessly complicated to approach a discussion of philia by
way of a second concept, charis. Why not discuss philia directly? There are two
reasons for proceeding in this rather oblique manner. First, although it is my
contention that philia is discussed implicitly throughout the dialogue, there is
littie explicit theoretical discussion of friendship, most of it concentrated in the
passages noted above. Second, because of the complex structure of the Gorgias it
is extremely difficult and frustrating to attempt to move with one concept in a
^Martha C.Nussbaum believes that philia necessarily entails personal affection (328n); A. R.
Hands disagrees on this point, but concurs that the term implies a relationship with some
obligation of mutual support (33). For K. J.Dover,philos means "anything on a scale from casual but
agr^ble acquaintance to intimacy of long standing'' (Greek Homosexuality 49).
straight line from beginning to end.^ The intertwining of charis and philia only
adds to the difficulty; indeed, any discussion of the former concept must
somehow include discussion of the latter. Fortimately, instances of charis are
sufficiently nimierous to serve as a convenient vehicle with a range wide
enough for navigating the dialogue and connecting the bulk of the work, where
references to friendship often seem to be made almost in passing, with the
specific discussions of philia at 507d7 and 510b4.4 Charis can help clarify what is
being said about philia, rhetoric, and philosophy.
I have chosen to use charis as a focal point, rather than one of the other
terms for help or obligation, because Socrates himself uses the word charis to
describe the products of rhetoric.^ Rhetoric, he tells Polus, produces charis
(gratification) and hedone (pleasure):
P: Then do you take rhetoric to be a habitude (empeiria) ?
S: I do, if you have no other suggestion.
P: Habitude of what?
S: Of producing a kind of gratification (charis) and pleasure
(hedoni).
P: Then you take rhetoric to be something fine (kalos) —an ability
to gratify (charizomai) people? (462c5-10)
The meaning of hedone, the familiar word for "pleasure," seems plain enough
as it is used here. But Socrates also uses charis —a particular kind of pleasure
which has to do with social relationships. If nothing else, Socrates' use of the
term, and Polus' assumption that an ability to produce charis is good, indicate
®E. R. Dodds describes the flow of the Gorgias as an ''ascending spiral" (3).
^Each instance ofcharis, philia, ora derivation of these is listed inAppendix A.
®When I refer to "Socrates/' Imean only Plato's character in the dialogues. I will briefly discuss
the relationship between Socrates and Plato in the section on method.
that the term had some importance in Greek culture and is worthy of closer
study. In fact, we shall see that charis has special relationships with eloquence in
general and poetry in particular, associations which reach back to Homer. This
raises the following questions: What is the particular relationship of charis to
rhetoric? If charis is a product of rhetoric, does that preclude its having an
association with philosophy? If not, what, if anything, distinguishes
philosophical charis from rhetorical charis? Ultimately, these questions must be
related to what can be said of the role of philia in the life of the rhetor and the
life of the philosopher.
Before I make an attempt at the dialogue itself, however, I must discuss
some important preliminary matters. First, any attempt to tmderstand a concept
which appears in Plato must consider the general problems of interpreting a
Platonic dialogue. Chapter Two takes up some of these problems and also
explains how I use historical and philological studies in my interpretive strategy.
Second, since charis is (from our modern perspective) a more exotic concept than
philia, and likely to be unfamiliar to my primary audience of non-classidsts.
Chapter Three briefly sun:imarizes its role in Greek culture and literature,
including its connection with eloquence. In Chapter Four I examine the
rhetorical situation of the Gorgias, including discussions of place and character,
with particular attention to Gorgias, after whom the dialogue was named.
Finally, I turn to the dialogue itself in Chapter Five. In brief, I argue that Plato,
through Socrates and the other characters, uses two meanings of charis —
"pleasure" and "favor" ~ to point out some faults of ancient Greek rhetorical
(political) practice and to suggest ways in which both personal and civic
friendships based on philosophy might be superior to those based on rhetoric.
For my part, then, I focus on the rhetorical aspects of the dialogue —how
the critique of rhetoric is accomplished. I should state as clearly as I can,
however, that it is not my intention to criticize this critique. In other words, my
goal is neither to examine every argument for logical flaws, as Terence Irwin
does, nor to defend rhetoric against Socrates' pointed criticisms, as many
rhetoricians have done and continue to do. This is not because I think these
projects unworthy. Although I respect Plato's intellect, I do not believe that he
and his character Socrates cannot and should not be criticized; as we shall see in
Chapter Five, it is Socrates himself who implies that refutation is an act of
friendship. Nevertheless, such acts of criticism, while vital, deserve more
attention than I can reasonably allow here, given the primary focus of my work
on the concepts of charis and philia. However, I do hope to contribute to a better,
more thorough tmderstanding of the critique of rhetoric presented in the
Gorgias. In the present study, then, I concentrate on showing how Plato, through
his characters, takes beliefs about favor and friendship which are current in his
time and makes them his own.
CHAPTER 2. INTERPRETIVE STRATEGY
Since the Gorgias is written in dialogue form, I must first discuss my
method of interpreting such a work. The body of scholarship on hermeneutics is
immense, and I cannot even attempt to discuss thoroughly textual interpretation
in general. What I can do is outline my own method of interpreting this
particular text and give some reasons why it seems appropriate. I have already
declared my intention to use the concept of charis as a way of exploring the
Gorgias, with the ultimate goal of sapng something about Plato's view of
philosophical and rhetorical friendships, and I have given as reasons both the
intimate connection between charis and philia, and the significance of Socrates'
identification of rhetoric with charis. The general method I use —examining the
significance of one or more concepts in an ancient text ~ is certainly not a new
one, and my approach is similar to the methods of two classicists: first, Bonnie
MacLachlan, who traces the history of charis in the Greek poets and dramatists;
and, second, S. E. Scully, whose 1973 dissertation outlines the workings of philia
and charis in the plays of Euripides. My study of the Gorgias owes a great deal to
their scholarship. From them I borrow the technique of examining how the
recurrence of a concept such as charis can illuminate the characters and develop
the themes of a dramatic text. However, since Platonic dialogues rest at a nexus
of three fields in which I am interested ~ philosophy, the history of rhetoric, and
classics —my modus operandi has been influenced by all three.
The Dialogues as Drama
I was careful to call the Gorgias a dramatic text in the above paragraph
because doing so raises an important issue: Are Platonic dialogues to be read and
8interpreted in the same way as other philosophical texts in the Western
tradition? In the field of andent philosophy, one recent controversy concerns
the significance of Plato's dialogues as drama. In 1968, Drew A. Hyland published
an essay> "Why Plato Wrote Dialogues," in which he argued that readings of
Platonic dialogues in the twentieth century have been primarily analytical in
nature; that is, the commentator concentrates on analyzing the logical structure
and validity of the arguments presented in each work. Although lip service is
often paid to the importance of dramatic action, character, and rhetorical
situation, in practice these things are often ignored, and the dialogues are
interpreted as if they were treatises in which Plato presents an improblematic
exposition of his views (38). However, according to Hyland, and to like-minded
philosophers such as Richard McKim, David Roochnik, and Charles H. Kahn,
the dramatic features of the dialogues are an inseparable part of the philosophy
of the dialogues, which reflect in profoimd ways Plato's conceptions of reason
and of philosophizing. In other words, Hyland and others argue that scholars
such as Terence Irwin, Gregory Vlastos, and Gerasimos Santas, who primarily
analyze arguments, often overlook the philosophical import of the dramatic
elements of the dialogues and, hence, the significance of any dialectical
arguments which may seem feeble when taken out of context.^
A look at relevant commentary on a passage from the Gorgias will
illustrate this controversy nicely since the logical elements of the dialogue have
been the target of a great deal of criticism. Dodds, for one, finds the logic of the
work "seldom entirely convincing and sometimes transparently fallacious" (3).
^As Charles L.Griswold, Jr. remarks, thequestion ofhow toread andinterpret Platonic dialogues
is allied to the question of why Plato wrote dialogues (1-2). These two questions are examine
thoroughly in ttie collection of essays Platonic Writings. Platonic Readings. Ed. Charles L.
Griswold, Jr., NewYork:Routledge, 1988.
Irwin, too, finds it "amply stocked" with weak logic (v). Socrates' conversation
with Polus at 474d3-475e8 is a case in point In this passage Socrates and Polus
discuss the reasons why something is kalos (beautiful, noble, fine, admirable),
and Socrates leads Polus to the conclusion that acting unjustly is always more
harmful than acting justly. However, several philosophers have found the logic
of Socrates' argument to be questionable/ Irwin, for example, discusses several
ambiguities in Socrates' terms that lead to logical weaknesses (154-158); Gregory
Vlastos also presents a critique of this passage concentrating on a specific
ambiguity that, had Polus recognized it, would have given him a way to avoid
refutation. Vlastos concludes that Socrates' victory is merely ad hominem and
not enough to refute Polus (459). Santas, in an analysis of the same passage,
agrees with Vlastos and adds an objection of his own (233-240). For these three
authors, these localized ambiguities and logical weaknesses are enough for them
to question the philosophic^ significance of the passage as a whole. Neither
Vlastos nor Irwin nor Santas, however, account for the manner in which the
dramatic elements of the dialogue could affect our imderstanding of the
dialectical exchange. Their analyses concentrate exclusively on the logical
structure and validity of the argument. Charles H. Kahn and Richard McKim
also see some weaknesses in the logic of the dialectic (sometimes for reasons
other than Vlastos'), but both argue that we must go beyond the logic to the
dramatic aspects of the exchange. Kahn, for example, argues that it is important
to understand both why Polus makes the responses that he does and why he fails
to respond adequately to Socrates' logical loopholes. This can be done only by
considering Polus as a specific character with a specific personality —in other
words, by taking into accotmt the dialogue as a drama. Kahn claims that all three
^The argument issummarized inAppendix B.
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refutations (GorgiaS/ Polus, Callicles) are indeed ad hominem in ways that
illustrate the Socratic elenchus "as a test of the harmony between the life and the
claims" of Socrates' interlocutors (76). Richard McKim goes even further than
Kahn, claiming that Socrates is "not even frying to meet the standards of logical
proof (34 emphasis his). For McKim, Socrates' battle is fought on
"psychological, not logical" groimd (36-37,46); Socrates uses the sense of shame
possessed by all three of his opponents (even Callicles), not to prove logically to
them that virtue is more beneficial than vice, but to show them that they already
believe that it is (36-37).
Clearly, the kind of insights one draws from a Platonic dialogue will
greatly depend on whether one interprets the dialogues as dramas or as mere
collections of logical arguments strung together with entertaining but
insignificant filler. My own strategy strongly emphasizes dramatic action and
characterization, as well as the literal statements of the characters. As someone
trained in rhetorical analysis, I naturally find the dramatic approach appealing
since it takes into account the context in which the arguments occur. Beyond
that, however, I agree with Hyland's claim that because Plato's Socrates is always
in conversation with specific people in specific situations, Plato may be "teaching
by example that there is truly no such thing as abstract philosophy, philosophy
that occurs in no place, philosophy the topos of which has no significance for the
content of the thought" (Finitude 14-15). Such a lesson may seem paradoxical
coming from an ancient philosopher who is generally thought of as the father of
the otherworldly Forms. Nevertheless, the dialogues remain prime examples of
philosophic thought deliberately contextualized. It is my conviction, then, that
context matters in the interpretation of a Platonic dialogue, and when I do
imdertake an analysis of an argument, as in the passage on friendship at 510b4-
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511a3,1 try to do so with a sensitivity to the "who, what, when where, and why"
in which it is embedded.
Interpreting the Gorgias as a drama also demands that readers be aware of
the implications of Plato's status as the author of a drama. In other words, since
Plato says nothing in his own voice, one must be very cautious in making
pronouncements about " Tlato's iheory* of this or that" (Hvland Finitude 2).
Specifically, one should be careful not to conflate Socrates with Plato himself,
and scholars who take a "dramatic" approach to the dialogues are usually careful
to distinguish between the character Socrates and his creator.® This is certainly a
difficult task, for it seems fairly clear that Socrates often expoimds essentially
Platonic ideas (the Palinode of the Phaedrus comes to mind). Nevertheless,
there are also times when what Socrates says appears to be at odds with what
Plato does as an author. It seems strange, for example, that Socrates should utter
a devastating critique of tragedy in the Gorgias, when Plato the author uses
tragedy overdy in references to Euripides' Antiope and covertly in at least one
allusion to Aeschylus' Agamemnon. These apparent contradictions suggest, if
nothing else, that one should consider carefully before deciding which, if any,
utterances of Socrates can be equated with Plato's own thought. I do not mean to
imply that Socrates is not the hero of Plato's works and represents much of what
Plato thinks is good and noble about philosophy. Nor do I think that nothing
can be said about Plato's philosophy as a whole. One of my goals, after all, is to
examine the ways I think Plato has used the concept of charis to say something
about political and philosophical philia. I simply think that Plato's teachings, as
®C)n these andother issues of interpreting Plato's dialogues, see thedted works byHyland, the
aforementioned volume edited by Griswold, and the introductory remarks in JacobKlein's A
Commentary on Plato's Meno. p. 3-31.
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far as they can be discerned, arise out of the whole of the dialogues as drama, not
simply out of the literal statements of his main character.
Historical Context and Intertextuality
Next, a word should be said about the role that elements of cultural
history, including other texts of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.E., play in my
analysis of the Gorgias. I have previously stated my belief that if Socrates uses
the terni charis to describe the effects of rhetoric, then Plato, as author, must
have a reason for making him do so, and that reason necessarily has to do with
how the term was used and imderstood in ancient Greece. Since my goal is to
imderstand how Plato, through his characters, uses charis in making his critique
of rhetoric, imderstanding how the term was used in Greek culture will aid in
interpreting not only Socrates' use of the term but also his interlocutors'
responses to it In his conunentary on the Meno, Jacob Klein reminds us of the
importance of consulting the vast amount of historical scholarship available to
us as an aid to interpretation:
In one respect, however, the philological and historical work which
began with the Alexandrians and reached such amazing heights and
depths in the nineteenth and present centuries remains
indispensable to us: it provides the means, limited though they may
be, of restoring some of the immediate intelligibility which so many
allusions, situations, names, proverbs, and pims in the dialogues
must have had for Plato's contemporaries. We should not forget
that, in most cases, there is a direct link between the possibility of
restoring their intelligibility and their being widely familiar in their
own day. It is the familiar that Plato is bent on exploiting. (10)
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Although Klein does not specifically say so^ we may reasonably extend his list
beyond names and proverbs to concepts and ideas such as charis, which also had
an "immediate intelligibility" to the Greeks. Indeed, the exploitation of the
familiar is everywhere in the Gorgias. from the opposition between chance and
art, to the popular code of behavior "helping friends and harming enemies/' to
the concept of charis itself. All of these words, concepts, and ideas have histories
in Greek culture which will help us imderstand their importance to Greek ways
of thinking and behaving. In part, then, I perform what Michael Herzfeld calls
the "excavation of concepts" because I highlight the cultural history of a small
part of Plato's vocabulary and attempt to restore for modem readers the
resonance these words and ideas must have had for Plato's contemporaries (57,
59, and passim). My project, therefore, incorporates what Richard Rorty calls a
"historical reconstruction" of the context in which Plato lived and worked (50-
55).^ In other words, I try, first, to understand charis and philia and ofher
concepts important to my analysis as they were understood by ancient Greeks,
and, second, to interpret the Gorgias in light of that imderstanding (Schiappa,
Protagoras 64-69). Although such an ancient culture can never be completely
understood on its own terms, trying to comprehend it as nearly as we are able
makes for an incomparably richer reading of the dialogues. It is by
understanding these familiar elements of Greek culture that we can see how
Plato interprets them and transforms them into philosophy.
Since "the familiar" for the ancient Greeks includes tragedies, comedies,
and other poetry, including Homer, we can use these artifacts also in
understanding the Platonic dialogues. There has long been interest in
^I find Rorty's term useful indescribingmy methodology, butIam notincomplete agreement with
Rorty's views on ttie history of philosophy.
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comparing tragedy and comedy with Platonic dialogues and Platonic philosophy
(Hyland, Finitude 111-137; Nightingale; Robchnik, Tragedy), and Paul Woodruff,
for one, believes that "an adequate literary [i.e., dramatic] reading of Plato should
make more use of the literature of Plato's period" (213). Indeed, the Gorgias
fairly begs us to do so since there are numerous explicit references to Euripides'
Antiope and a poem by Pindar, a mention of the comic poet Epicharmus, and
several allusions to the Agamemnon of Aeschylus.'® Nor does this exhaust the
list of allusions to other ^dent Gredc works. Although I do not discuss all of
these works in what follows, I do discuss passages from tragedy or comedy which
illuminate either the characters of the Gorgias or the terms used to describe
rhetoric. In fact, I refer to these plays more often than I refer to Aristotle for help
in understanding the Greek cultural context. This not because Aristotle is
unhelpful but because he is a different philosopher from Plato, much more
systematic, and often uses terms in particular ways for his own purposes. So
although Aristotle has something to say about charts and a great deal to say about
friendship, it seems more helpful to use texts which preceded Plato and may
have had some influence on him rather than to read Aristotle backwards into
Plato and to risk conflating teacher and student unnecessarily.
'Unfortunately, theAntiope is extant only in fragments. For translations anda plausible
reconstruction,seeBrunoSnell, ScenesfromGreekDrama. Berkeley: U of California P, 1967, p. 70-
98. Oh the role of the Antiope in the Gorgias. see the cited work by Nightingale.
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CHAPTER 3. CHARIS IN ANCIENT GREEK CULTURE AND LITERATURE
Charis, as defined earlier, is a kind of social pleasure found in giving and
receiving favors. This definition, while not inaccurate, is a bit simplistic, and in
this chapter I give a more detailed exposition of the different applications of
charis, I have already indicated that charis is intimately connected with love and
friendship. Moreover, because of the social component of its meaning, charis
permeates the erotic, ethical, economic, and religious spheres of ancient Greek
life. Bonnie MacLachlan describes the scope of its importance in archaic
literature:
Charis flickered when beautiful women sparkled; soldiers brought
charis to their commanders on the battiefield or expected to win it
when they fought well; charis graced appropriate behavior and
speech and was a distinguishing mark of nobility; it was at the
center of the feast; in the verses of the love poets it sat upon the hair
or the eyes of the beloved. (3-4)
Obviously, charis ranges widely through Greek social life, and it will be
impossible in this short simimary to discuss all its applications in detail.i^ I
shall, however, discuss three aspects of charis most important to my analysis of
the Gorgias: its association with beauty and sexuality, its connection to giving
and receiving favors between friends, or philoi, and its special relationship to
eloquence. As we shall see, these three aspects of charis are related in important
ways.
^^For a more complete treatment, see BonnieMacLachlan's excellent work.
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Charis, Beauty^ and Philia
As MacLachlan says in the passage above, charis was present to the ancient
Greeks "when beautiful women sparkled." In fact, one of the most important
facets oi charis is this association with great beauty and sexual gratification. The
mythical Charities, for example, in addition to their roles as chthonic goddesses
of vegetation and fertility, are said to be companions of Aphrodite. As her
attendants, they are the divine source of the pleasure human beings feel when
responding to sexual allure (MacLachlan 44-46, 60; Scott 1-3; Zielinski). In
human relationships, the charis of beauty —often the beauty of adolescent boys
and girls —prompts desire and love, causing a lover to praise and to pursue the
beloved (MacLachlan 56-72). But the charis belonging to and prompted by beauty
is more than a delight in ordinary good looks; charis comes from something
extra, something that gleams or glitters or shines from the beloved. The dewy
glow of youth, the glimmer of beautiful jewelry, or the radiant light in a loved
one's eyes are all associated with charis-pleasvie (MacLachlan 34-39).i2
examples from Homer illustrate this charis: In the Iliad, when Hera prepares to
seduce Zeus in order to distract him from the Trojan war, she anoints her body
with oil, dresses in embroidered robes fastened with golden brooches, and adorns
herself with earrings which shine with charis (XIV.170-183). The luster of her
oiled skin, the flash of the golden brooches, and the sparkle of the finely-made
earrings are all erotically attractive and contribute to her personal c/ian's-allure
(Scott 3;MacLachlan 34-35). Similarly, when Odysseus confronts the Phaeacian
maiden Nausicaa after he is washed up on the shores of her homeland, the
goddess Athena anoints him with charis, "as when a man overlays silver with
borrow several terms fromMacLachlan whichdescribe situations involvingcharis. These
include such terms as charis-event, chari$-p\easure, and c?wns-relationship.
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gold." As Nausicaa watches the hero, who is "gleaming with beauty and charts"
she marvels at his god-like appearance (Od. VI.232-243). In the first example,
sexual intercourse is the result of Hera's charis. In the second, Nausicaa loses her
fear of a strange man and agrees to help him. In both cases, the charis of great
beauty facilitates social interaction, either by being a spur to erotic love, or by
rendering another person more willing to assist, more willing to treat one as a
friend.
When a loved one grants sexual gratification to an amorous pursuer, in
either heterosexual or homosexual encoimters, the verb used to describe the act
is often charizomai. This usage is similar to our now quaint expression "giving
[someone] our favors" (Dover, Greek Homosexuality 44-45; Henderson 160).
Although a part of any erotic arrangement, sexual charis plays a primary role in
cementing the bonds of marital philia.'^ ^ The Charities of myth were thought to
attend the wedding ceremony to guarantee such an "active" sexual relationship
(MacLachlan 45). Although MacLachlan notes that the charis of marriage
encompasses all types of reciprocal favors and mutual obligations in the shared
life of wife and husband (228), sexual charis in marriage is most often associated
with female sexuality and is part of the woman's contribution to the smooth
functioning of the union (MacLachlan 28; Redfield 196). According to James
Redfield, the specific charis of sexual pleasure was thought to be a physical
instantiation of a couple's homophrosune, "oneness of mind" (197). '^* Once
again, charis facilitates human interaction.
^^The difference between erotic love, eros, and the loveofphilia is not insignificant, especially in
Plato, but in general Greek usage the boundaries are blurred when speaking of relationships with a
sexual component. SeeDover. Greek Homosexuality. 49-50.
^^Admittedly, this is an ideal. I do not imply that the husband-wife relationship was at all
"equal" in ttie modem sense. It was not
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Charts, FavoiS/ and Philia
As both MacLachlan (5) and Scott (2, 6) note, a charis event is not limited
to states of mind or emotions but usually includes a more tangible object or
activity. In one of its most important manifestations, charis ties gods with
human beings, or human beings with each other, through the mutual pleasiu*e
of gift or favor exchange: gifts bestowed by a lover on a beloved obtain sexual
favor; sacrifice given the gods is rewarded (one hopes) with benevolence and
protection; excellence in battle or on the athletic field receives honor (timi) in
the form of both praise and more tangible spoils; favors done for family
members or friends are returned in appropriate ways and at opportune times ~
xenia, for example, the mutual hospitality of the Homeric guest-code, is based on
reciprocal favors and is thus a kind of charis- relationship (Blundell 41; Kurke
135-159; MacLachlan 7, 67-70; Scott 8-9; Herman, passim).^^
Because of the notion of reciprocity inherent in the concept, the
importance of charis (even into the fourth century) as a creator and sustainer of
social cphesiveness cannot be overestimated. A favor (charis) done on one's
behalf is to be returned in kind or otherwise actively and publicly acknowledged^
Thus, the charis-eveni of "doing a favor" could encompass the original feeling of
good will on the part of the giver,i^ the tangible gift itself, the feeling of gratitude
on the part of the receiver, and any active return for the favor. The continued
reciprocity driving such events clearly can become a cycle of mutual benefit
which solidifies social relationships (MacLachlan 77-78). In the archaic period,
however, charis-favor was not "charity" in the modem altruistic sense.
^^Scott argues that the notion of reciprocal favor-exchange is not explicit in Homer, but there are
"signs whidi ... point to a concept of exchange of charites" (8).
^^According toScott, "although theintention to please cannot be proved tobepresent in dtaris or
charizomai" inHomer, "this intention may reasonably bepresumed to have b^n present" (12).
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Reciprocity was expected. To fail to return or to acknowledge a favor, or to do so
parsimoniously, was a grave social error and could cause one to be ostracized
^dacLachlan 6;Hands 26-28). Only later, as the oldways became incorporated
into life in a polis, does c/wn's-as-favor come to be identified more closely with
altruism.17
As a reflection of power, charis flows readily between social equals;
however, the reciprocity of charis is more appropriately described as proportional
rather than equal, reflecting the social status of the participants. This is true even
in Aristotle's time (MacLachlan 81). Perhaps the most important way in which
Homeric charis works in an unequal relationship is between gods and human
beings. Although charis can forge a bond between the human and the divine, as
Walter Burkert puts it, "the sense in which men need the gods is quite different
from the sense in which the gods need men" (189). Since the gods do not stand
in the same relationship with human beings as human beings with one another
—the gods are athanatoi, (immortal) and forever apart from humanity —charis is
not required to be given and returned equally. In other words, if human beings
make sacrifice to the gods, the gods may — or may not —answer favorably.
Charis and Speech
Polus' enthusiastic approval of charis is thus deeply rooted in Greek
culture. Of particular interest, however, is the relationship of charis-pleasure
and speech, an association not unique to Plato; indeed, as MacLachlan
demonstrates, it is a venerable association found in the works of Homer and
Hesiod. In Homer especially, eloquence is considered a charis from the gods, as
illustrated by the following passage from the (Ddvssev. When Euryalus the
^^See Aristotle's definition, Rhet. 1385a21-23.
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Phaeadan insults Odysseus, impugning his athletic ability, the wily hero replies
in terms of charis:
So true is it that the gods do not give c/zan's-gifts (charienta) to all
alike, not form nor mind nor eloquence. For one man is inferior in
comeliness, but the god sets a crown of beauty upon his words, and
men look upon him with delight, and he speaks on unfalteringly
with sweet modesty (aidos), and is conspicuous among the gathered
people, and as he goes throughout the city men gaze upon him as
upon a god. Another again is in comeliness like the immortals, but
no crown of charis is set about his words. (Vm 167-175)
Charis is here attributed not to the words in themselves (Scott 5) nor to mere
himian skill in speaking; the charis of eloquence is something more, an addition
that comes from and adds a spark of the divine, like the charis that gleams from
god-like physical beauty.
That chariS'HUed speech should be persuasive is no surprise; in
MacLachlan's words, it has "a softening effect" on the audience, producing
respect (aidds) for the speaker (25). In this effect it resembles the charis of beauty
which Athena granted to Odysseus on the shores of Nausicaa's homeland. In the
passage from the Odyssey just above, Odysseus reproaches the Phaeadan for his
insult —a form of speech which is "unmannerly" (ou kata kosmon) and
provocative of anger ~ and stresses its inferiority to eloquence, which is full of
"sweet modesty" (aidoi meilichie) and brings the speaker respect and awe
(Vin.167-185). This passage of the Odyssey introduces another term of social
redprodty which is assodated with charis in archaic speech situations —the term
aidds, which may be translated as "modesty/' "respect," or even "shame."
According to Richard P. Martin, "the possessor of kharis transmits aidds (and
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therefore receives it also)" (45 n35). An accomplished speaker, through the
generation of mutual respect, thus calms violent emotions, diffuses tension, and
aids in conflict resolution (Martin 43^5; MacLachlan 26). This notion of the
civilizing influence of eloquence survives as a commonplace in the history of
rhetoric.^®
Although the gift of eloquence is usually a positive one, the potential for
excess and deceit is recognized, and charis is usually associated with moderation
and circumspection in speech, as it is in the previous example from the Odyssey.
Similarly, Hesiod proclaims in Works and Davs that the greatest charis comes
from speaking moderately (719-21), and that charis should not be produced
through falsehood (709).^^ Moderation is also associated with the speech of the
symposium, where, according to MacLachlan, it is "the moderation of the tongue
(guaranteed by moderation in drink) that ensures the presence of charis" (81^82).
Charis in speech thus appears to be related to the rhetorical concepts of to prepon
and kairos —appropriateness and timeliness.
Although charis is not linuted to one kind of discourse, it has a special
relationship to poetry, where it often "conveys the notion of 'pleasure, mirth' in
conventional descriptions of poetry and its effects" (Nagy 91). In the Heroic Age,
poetry was an integral part of the communal feast, an occasion filled with the
charis of human community and delight in song (Nagy 18-19; MacLachlan 23-24,
82-83). One ancient sourc^o uses the phrase "charities of the Charities"
(Chariton . . . charitas) as a metaphor for both the wine drunk at a symposium
and his proffered poem, which he hopes will prompt a return gift of an ode
^®See Isocrates, Antidosis. 253.1-257.7; Plato, Protagoras. 320c8-323a4; Cicero, DeOratbre 133-34.
^^The translation of Works and Davs 709 is somewhat controversial. On this see MacLachlan 161-
62.
2®Dionysius Chalcus, fr. 1.
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(MacLachlan 83). In Pindar (early fifth century), charis is specifically associated
with praise in poetry; the poefs victory ode is a charis for the athlete, celebrating
his arete and his success in competition. The gift of praise, which can be repeated
again and again in the form of song, gives the victor a kind of immortality
(Kurke 62-82;MacLachlan 87-89). But this charis, though directed toward specific
individuals and transmitted through the mediimi of the poet, is still a gift of the
gods;
God brings about all things for mortals
and plants charis in song. (fr. 141)
Charis in the Fifth- and Fourth-Centuries B.C.E.
In most early Greek literature, as in the quotation from Pindar above, the
gods serve as an external standard for the basis of c/wris-relationships and the
source from which all charis flows (MacLachlan 87-90). Already in Pindar's time,
however, much of Greek life began to be secularized, and MacLachlan argues that
"c/mrzs-exchange, as a strictly human practice, no longer had an external,
absolute point of reference which would preserve the symmetry of the exchange"
(152). She attributes this change in part to the intellectual and social upheavals
of the fifth century and the questioning of traditional values in which the
sophists played such a large role. Who could say any longer what constituted a
true charis if the value of charis depended on the differing social conventions of
human beings? (152-153). Like many other Greek concepts such as arete and
dike, then, charis seemed to float freely.
In Athens, of course, these changes coincided with the rise of democracy,
and the old relationships and values of the Homeric aristocracy formed an
uneasy mix with the newer values of the democratic polis. Loyalty to friends and
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family, for example, came into conflictwith loyalty to the city-stateP Although
the notion of reciprocal favors remained an important part of commimity life,
since one's fellow-citizens are, in a sense, one's philoi (Blimdell 41-49;
MacLachlan 80-82), it was now possible to distinguish both personal and public
charis. Wealthy individuals gave gifts to the state through expenditures known
as liturgies, financing public works such as ships or choruses for dramatic
productions (Fine 433-435; Stockton 107-08). Although the benefactor ideally
performed these duties, as Aristotle says, "for the nobility of the action" (NE
IV.ii.7-8), there is evidence that some return was expected. It was a
commonplace in forensic cases, for example, in which a citizen might be charged
with treason or taking bribes, for the defendant to enumerate all of the benefits —
military and cultural —previously bestowed on the state by both himself and his
ancestors. These recitals amount to a defense of the character of the accused, and
the defendant often asks for charis from the jury in return for all of his previous
benefactions.22 Although the term charis in these speeches is often translated as
"return" or "gratitude," the meaning sometimes seems to approach that of our
word "mercy." This use of charis in the law courts will become an important
theme in the Gorgias.
Since the concept of charis itself became controversial, it is not surprising
that the relationship of charis to speech also came into question, particularly in
light of the increasing importance of rhetoric in the life of the democratic polis.
As we shall see, the notions of personal and political favor, as well as the power
This conflict is a favorite d\eme of the tragedians. The Antigone of Sophocles is perhaps the
best-known example.
^ Examples of therequest forcharis from thejurycan befound in several forensic defense speeches
attributed to Lysias. See Lysias XVnn, "On the Confiscation of the Prop)erty of the Brother of
Nlcias: Peroration/' 23,26f;XX, "For Polystratus/' 30-31. On political gratitude in general, see
Josq?h William Hewitt, "TTie Development of Political Gratitude/' TAPA, 55 (1924): 35-51.
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of the social pleasure produced by speech, are issues which inform the Gorgias.
At the risk of stating the obvious, however, I think it worth noting that these
questions did not originate with Plato. There is an easy tendency among scholars
in the field of rhetoric and composition to think of Plato as the sole opponent of
the sophists and of rhetoric, and thus to dismiss his criticisms as "carpings" (Enos
75). Although Plato was certainly a vocal opponent of sophistic rhetoric, the
urgency of the concern about rhetoric in ancient Greece cannot be overestimated.
Plato was certainly not alone in exploring the potential for good and bad in
rhetoric, nor in dramatizing the connections among speech, pleasure, arid
political oratory. Aristophanes in comedy and Euripides in tragedy, to name
only two examples, raised many of the same questions during Socrates' own
lifetime. In the Knights, for example, Aristophanes parodies political oratory
and orators (Cleon in particular) through the actions and words of a slave and a
sausage-seller who attempt to control the old man "Demus" through flattery and
gifts of food.23 And in Euripides' Hecuba, the chorus of captive Trojan women
bitterly describe Odysseus as dimocharistes, "charis-ple&ser of the demos."^^
Some scholars have noted that the Hecuba shows the awful acts ~ murder, for
instance —which travel under the name of charis (Pearson 144-147). While there
are, of course, differing interpretations of these plays ~ some see the Hecuba as an
indictment of rhetoric while others believe it offers a defense^s —it is clear that
the questions raised about rhetoric in the Gorgias are not simply "carpings" but
23The analogybetween rhetoric and cookery is an interestingparallelbetween the Gorgias and ti\e
Knights, in which the slave advises the sausage-seller to "Win over Demus with the savoury
sauce/ Of little cookery phrases" (215-216). In the final scene, the sausage-seller and his rival,
Paphlagon (whose name means "blusterer") open their food hampers and ply Demus with
delicacies.
^'^This is MacLachlan's translation.
^For examples of theformer position, seeJames H.Oliver, Demokratia. the Gods, and the Free
World. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1960,p. 91-117;for a defense, see James L. Kastely,
"Violence and Rhetoric in Euripides's Hecuba," PMLA. 108 (Oct. 1993):1036-1049.
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part of a vital controversy. I now begin to examine that controversy as Plato
presents it in the Gorpas.
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CHAPTER 4. THE RHETORICAL SITUATION OFTHE GQRGIAS
Place and Time
Although the Gorgias begins with a prologue, some commentators note
that it lacks much of the descriptive scene-setting found in other works like the
Protagoras and the Symposium (Dodds 6; Plochman and Robinson xx). We
know that the dialogue takes place in Athens in front of an audience which has
come to hear Gorgias speak. Beyond this simple fact^^ however, matters are less
clear, and neither the setting nor the exact dramatic date are known. Several
dramatic dates have been suggested for the dialogue —from the textual evidence
itself, Dodds finds a wide range of possible dates, from 429-405B.C.E.26 As to
setting, Dodds argues that the initial contact between Callicles, who has attended
Gorgias' speech, and Socrates and Chaerephon, who have come from the
marketplace, takes place outside a "gymnasion or other public building,"
whereupon the trio immediately moves inside for the bulk of the conversations
(188). Although the evidence for this movement from outside to inside is based
on only one small phrase (Callicles' reference at 447c8-9 to "those inside," ton
endon onton), such movement seems consistent with the general emphasis in
the dialogue on moving toward a charis of the "inner" soul and away from a
more materialistic and "worldly" charis. At the same time, however, we never
really leave the realm of the public since there is always an audience of
undetermined size in attendance. It seems to me, then, that the situational
ambiguity of the dialogue —a semi-public space —suggests a Platonic conception
2^The dateofcomposition ofthe dialogue isalso uncertain. Thompson suggests 395-389 b.ce (xx);
Dodds 387-385b.ce.(26-7); and Ledger 386 b.cl (224).
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of the individual soul as both separate from society yet always connected to it
This idea of separate-yet-connected will recur in Socrates' conversation with
PoluS/ and it recurs again when we consider the life of Socrates himself.
Dodds attributes this ambiguity of setting, in part, to the dialogue's "direct
dramatic" form, which is acted by the characters rather than narrated by Socrates
or another party {6)P On the question of why Plato so constructed the Gorgias,
Dodds merely speculates that Plato was "less interested" in this dramatic
situation than in some others (6). But why should this be so? Although we can
never know Plato's real intentions, we can try to identify some possible effects of
this direct dramatic construction and ask why it should be important to the
dialogue as a whole. As Strauss remarks, one effect of the "performed" dialogue
is distancing —a removal of the "bridge between the characters of the dialogue
and the reader"(58). A narrated dialogue, on the other hand, is more intimate in
that it creates a special bond between reader and narrator —in dialogues narrated
by Socrates (the Lysis, for example), we are often privy to Socrates' thoughts and
motives, an access not necessarily enjoyed by his interlocutors (58). In such cases,
this intimacy provides a filter through which the reader sees the dramatic action.
A performed dialogue gives us no special "privileges" in entering the characters'
inner thoughts. We are more spectators at a play than friends listening to a story.
Consequently, the most important effect of this form might be that it distances us
from Socrates. Indeed, Dodds has remarked that the character of Socrates seems
different in this dialogue: he seems less playful, more strident and dogmatic,
with less of the self-depreciatinghumor he exhibits in other dialogues (16-17).
^Many "performed" dialogues, however, are notable for their emphasis on scene-setting. The
Phaedrus is a prominent example.
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Audience
There are many levels of audience in a Platonic dialogue, and the Gorgias
is no exception. First, there is apparently a crowd in attendance, many of whom
are likely to be young men contemplating an association with Gorgias. They
remain anonymous throughout the dialogue but offer approval of and
encouragement to the speakers. Second, all of the main characters except
Socrates (and even he, for a brief time) become part of the audience when they
are not actively engaged in conversation. Third, we ourselves who read the
dialogue are members of another audience. I will not consider all the
implications of these different levels of audience in detail; however, it is
important to keep in mind the public (or, at least, semi-public) nature of the
dialogue because doing so reminds us that while Socrates appears to converse
with only one person at a time, there is always a connection to a wider audience.
Characters
Plochman and Robinson remark that the "dramatic-fictional aspects of the
dialogue are concentrated here" rather than in any descriptions of action or scene
(xx). This seems to me to be true and appropriate to the dialogue's focus on
politics as a shaper of souls. In this section, then, I give a brief summary of what
we know (or thinkwe know) about the characters as historical figures, along
with my view of how they function in the dialogue. It is important to do so
because uriderstanding as much as we can about the characters as historical
figures aids in establishing the contextof the dialogue. In other words, since
Plato has taken the trouble to construct his dialogue around certain historical
figures, we as readers should attempt to become familiar with them. Again, the
characters are part of the cultural "familiar" that Plato is attempting to exploit.
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With respect to Gorgias, it seems especially worthwhile to review some recent
scholarship before starting the analysis of the dialogue. This is not because recent
theory will be used to berate Plato for presenting Gorgias as something of a dolt,
as some rhetoricians charge. Plato is, after all, writing dialogues, which are
neither histories nor treatises, and as the author of a drama, albeit a
philosophical drama, he is free to make Gorgias a slightly comic figure. In this
he is little different from Aristophanes, whom we do not generally berate for
painting Socrates as a scalawag in the Clouds. However, it is important to realize
that Plato's picture of Gorgias is probably distorted with regard to the actual man.
Although it is not the purpose of this study to dwell on those distortions, it is
important for each reader to look for possible inconsistencies and to decide for
him- or herself how significant they are. And if, as Jacob Klein argues, the name
of a character conjures up an image that we carry into the dialogue with us (35-
36), it seems important to highlight a variety of those images as they currently
stand.
Gorgias: Since the title of our dialogue is Gorgias, it is appropriate to start
with the question, "Who is Gorgias?" The answer is both easy and
extraordinarily difficult, involving as it does the question of the relationship
between dramatic character and historical figure. In the simplest terms, we know
that Plato named the Gorgias after the famous Sicilian rhetorician who visited
Athens as an ambassador in the fifth century B.C.E. (Enos 74). Beyond this crude
fact, however, things become controversial very quickly. Scholars, often split
along "party lines," have commented with varying degrees of indignation on
Plato's portrayal of Gorgias and his views in this dialogue —in fact, Gorgias
himself is said to have read the dialogue and commented on Plato's ability "to
satirize" (iamhizo) (DK82A.15a). Among classicists. Lamb calls Plato's Gorgias "a
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man of fine sense and integrity" though possessed of some "absurd" pretensions
(255); Dodds describes him as "a well-meaning but somewhat muddleheaded old
gentlemen" (9); and George Kennedy calls him an "amiable^ if pompous"
interlocutor who is nevertheless "inept" at arguing for his views (19, 35). To no
one's surprise, stronger statements about the character come from rhetoricians
such as Richard Enos, who calls the characterization "biased ,.. a gross
misrepresentation" (72), and "blatantly imfair" (85); and Gronbeck, who
proclaims it a "degradation" (27). On the other hand, philosopher Guthrie sees
"no marks of caricature" in Socrates' conversation with Gorgias (181 n2).
Certainly the historical accuracy of Plato's portrayal of the Sophists has
been controversial for many decades; Guthrie shows that the debate dates back
well into the nineteenth century (9-13). That the debate has such a long history is
testimony to the difficulty of determining accurately the nature of both Sophistic
teachings in general and Gorgian teachings in particular. On the one hand, the
character Gorgias does not seem an accurate portrayal of the historical figure, if
only because Plato's Gorgias makes some admissions inconsistent with remarks
made in Gorgias' extant works. For example, at 454e4-7, Gorgias' admission that
there is a form of persuasion that can produce knowledge (qyistemi) seems
absurd in the light of both the On Not Being, which, according to some scholars,
debunks the whole idea of true knowledge, and the Encomium of Helen, where
persuasion is said always to be achieved by "false argument" (DK 82Bll.ll).28
Still, one must be cautious in appealing to Gorgias' speeches as flat statements of
intellectual doctrine since the works, which are regrettably few, are notoriously
2®Bruce McComiskey hasrecently written a critique ofPlato's Gorgias which spells outmany
possible inconsistencies between the dialogue and Gorgias' speeches. See list of Works Cited. For
English translations of the Diels-Kranz Greek fragments, see Rosamund Kent Sprague, ed.. The
Older Sophists. Columbia: U of South Carolina P, 1972.
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difficult to interpret, often show distinctive elements of linguistic play, and raise
a strong possibility of parody. Thesehermeneutic problems have raised doubts
about the seriousness of Gorgias' intentions in producing his speeches
(Robinson). Accordingly, agreement on the nature of Gorgias' intellectual
orientation has been hard to come by, and over the years a variety of
philosophical and epistemological labels have been attached to him. Gronbeck,
for example, draws parallels between Gorgias' thought and modem
existentialism-phenomenology. Bett (150) and de Romilly (20) call him a skeptic;
Guthrie (272), McComiskey (82f), and Consigny ("Gorgias' Use" 288) a relativist
(or "relativistic"); Smith (344) and Hunt (28-29) a nihilist; and Untersteiner an
"irrationalist" (159).
Within the fields of English Studies and Speech Communications, the
variety of opinions is nearly as diverse. In 1991, Susan Jarratt identified three
approaches to Sophist scholarship, and these three categories seem appropriate to
scholarship which deals more spedfically with Gorgias, at least within the fields
of English Studies and Speech Commimication. The first approach, which Jarratt
calls "historical legitimation," sees Gorgias as opposed to Plato and Aristotle but
possessed of an alternative philosophy and epistemology (6-7). The most
prominent representative of this position is Richard Enos, who argues that
Gorgias belonged to "a philosophical tradition" begun by Empedocles, which
"stressed probability, antithesis, relativism and sense-perception" (83); but he also
hints at a hermeneutic stance for Gorgias, "a belief that speech ... does not
demonstrate an essence or truism but reveals through interpretation partial
^knowledge' of real-world phenomena" (80). Enos' remarks are generally
compatible with the work of several other scholars, who largely agree that
Gorgias 1) rejected the possibility of human knowledge of essences, if not their
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actual existence (Consigny 49; Gronbeck 30-32; Guthrie 194,253-54,271; Kerferd
80-81, 98-100; Segal 99-102,113); 2) recognized opinion (doxa), which is controlled
by logos, as the primary medium of human judgment (Segal 111-112,
Untersteiner 116-117); 3) practiced a pedagogy based on commonplaces and
controversia, similar but perhaps not identical to that of Protagoras and other
sophists (Aristotle Soph. Ref. 183b36-184al; Cicero, Brutus 46-47; Untersteiner
141); 4) held a relativistic notion of rhetoric based on kairos, in which arguments
are generated and judgments made according to their appropriateness in
particular circumstances (Enos 83; Schiappa, Protagoras 73-74; Poulakos 38-42);
and 5) had an "empirical" bent, including an early interest in physical science
and in the physiology of perception and human psychology (Gronbeck 29;
Kerferd 39; Segal 99,101,135n4, n6).
The second approach to Sophistic scholarship identified by Jarratt grows
out of, but is not identical to, Jacques Derrida's deconstruction and his critique of
Western philosophy (7-9). In the area of composition studies, for example,
Sharon Crowley and Victor Vitanza have interpreted C^orgias through a
deconstnictionist and postmodernist lens. Vitanza, for example, uses Gorgias'
On Not Being as a springboard for his promotion of a post-modem, non-
foundational pedagogy which is subversive of traditional Western thought.
Crowley, too, has connected Gorgias with Derrida, arguingfor a pedagogy which
uses writing less as "a handmaiden of speech" and more as a powerful device in
its own right (284). Jarratt herself uses a "feministappropriation of
deconstruction as a search for historically located and politically significant
difference" (xxiii) in her historical readings ofGorgias' Helen. Although many of
Enos' remarks about Gorgias' intellectual position, especially those about kairos
and anti-essentialism, are accepted by scholars who give more decidedly
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"deconstructive" readings of Gorgias, it remains controversial whether
"philosophy of communication" or "epistemology" are appropriate labels for
Gorgian thinking. Consigny, for example, argues that Enos, Gronbeck, and
Untersteiner are too eager to interpret Gorgias' sometime-use of antithesis as an
"epistemolog)^" and that Gorgias is better imderstood as a non-foundational,
hermeneutic thinker in a Rortian sense ("Styles" 48-50).29 Consigny presents
Gorgias' rhetoric as radically opposed to mainstream Western philosophy in that
Gorgias attempts to adapt himself to different styles and genres of discourse, each
of which may have their own set of possible truths, rather than seeking an over
arching discourse which can articulate a final Truth (49-50), In fact, Consigny
argues that each of Gorgias' extant works ~ defense speech, funeral oration,
encomium, Eleatic speculation —are better seen as parodies of genre, playful
speeches by which Gorgias undermines the notion of any reliable connections
among thought, language, and reality, thus freeing the listener from the tyranny
of privileged discourses ("Sophistic Freedom").^^ Once again, these views are
supported by the work of other scholars who believe Gorgias had an anti-
essentialist position which raised serious questions about, if not altogether
denied, the referential capacity of language (Kerferd 80-81; Moss 215-216), but
focused much of his attention, at least in his later years, on practical applications
of rhetoric in political life (Segal 99,102-103; Smith 4-5; Enos 84; Gronbeck 35).
^^There isgeneral agreement between Enos and Consigny that Gorgias rejected the notion of
ontological essences, but tiiereis somedisagreement over terminology. It seems possibleforEnos to
speak of a non-foundational epistemology,aldiough he uses the term "nonformal" instead of "non-
foundational'' (83). Consigny follows Rorty, however, forwhom an epistemology is bydefinition
foundational.
^or an account of the similarities between the ancient sophists and post-modernism, written from
a Platonicperspective, seeRodchnik, TheTragedvofReason, passim.
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Jarratfs third identified approach to the Sophists is social constructionism,
which posits the human commvmity as the locus of knowledge (9-10).®^
Although Protagoras is the Sophistnonnally appealed to in discussions of
sophistic social and educational theory and practice (J^rratt 98-102; Guthrie 145-
146,173-75), and no one to my knowledge has explicitly linked Gorgias to social
constructionism, his anti-essentialism, his apparent emphasis on both the power
of language (Helen, DK 82.11), and his practical applications of rhetoric to
political life (Enos 85; Gronbeck 35) would seem at least partly compatible with
this modem social theory of knowledge.
Jarratfs scheme of classification is useful for trying to place Gorgias with
respect to modem and post-modem ways of thinking, but such efforts sometimes
say more about modem and post-modem thought than they do about Gorgias.
Indeed, any single contemporary label seems to fail to describe Gorgias' thinking
completely, and for good reason. As Edward Schiappa has recently pointed out,
Gorgias belongs to a time period before any such classifications; in Schiappa's
words, Gorgias is "predisciplinar)^' (310). He lived at the end of the pre-Socratic
era, when discourse tj^es and intellectual products in general were distinguished
by only the roughest of categories, and the magico-religious coexisted with the
empirical and rational in many intellectual practices, including the
protodisdplines of medicine and science (Dodds, Greeks 144-146,192-193; Grmek
210-244). Thus, modem efforts to squeeze Gorgias into an intellectual
Procmstean bed will surely lop off parts of the whole. As Schiappa notes, "It is
easy to fixate on Gorgias' exotic style and his "magical" use of language and, as a
^^This definition is admittedly a bit simplistic since "social constructionism/' at least in
composition studies, is now part of a broader category of social theories of knowledge. The original
"socialconstructionism,'' in which knowledge is formedby theconsensus ofmembers of a particular
community, has come under attack by feminists, for example, for its neglect of the power
relationshi]!^ in human society.
35
result, neglect his more 'rationalistic' side" (315). According to Schiappa, Gorgias
was part of a general trend toward a "literate/rationalistic/' style in prose
composition through his combination of more logical organization and apagogic
argumentation with poetic/mythical subject matters and commonplaces (315-
317).
With regard to the pleasure of logos, however^ there is litde reason to
doubt that, whatever his intentions, the historical Gorgias was lauded for the
pleasurable effects of his speeches. Ancient sources testify to his use of rhetorical
figures of all types, which were often novel and extremely attractive to Athenian
audiences. Philostratus, for example, reports that Gorgias became famous for
using rhetorical strategies and figures "by which speech becomes sweeter
(hedidn) than it has been and more impressive" (DK 82.A1.2).32 Even Gorgias
himself, in the Encomium of Helen, calls the speech a paignion —a game, a
sportive poem, an entertainment (DK 82.B11.2l).33 Moreover, Gorgias does seem
to imply in the Helen that one purpose of a speech is to bring delight (terpsis) to
the audience (DK B82.il.5), and he appears to emphasize the emotional effects of
logos as well (DK 82.311,8-14). Of course, this is but one speech, and perhaps
modem scholars have exerted too much effort in turning it into a definitive
commentary on logos. Nevertheless, Gorgias' statement that poetry is "speech
with meter" at least implies a profound connection between poetry and rhetoric
(DK 82B.11.9), and scholars such as Verdenius, Segal, and Untersteiner have all
emphasized the connections of Gorgias' rhetoric with both the emotional effects
and the delight ofpoetry, mainly through analyses of these and other passages of
32See also DK82A.2-5; DK82A.35.
^prague translates paignion as "diversion.'
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the Helen. Perhaps it was this aspect ofGorgian rhetoric that caused Plato to
choose him as a basis for his fictional character.
Ultimately, "what Gorgias really thought" may remain something of an
enigma tomodem readers, and so it will be impossible to know how much Plato
has distorted the historical Gorgias. For Schiappa,however, the fact that Gorgias
appeared to be questioning traditional forms of thought "is a more important
step ... than any particular claim" hemay have made ("Gorgias's Helen," 320).
For example, one of the most important aspects ofGorgias' work, with regard to
the Helen, at least, is its tendency to himianize; that is, Gorgias shows a
willingness to incorporate various "secular" explanations for what were
previously considered completely supernatural phenomena (316-321). This is
not surprising since Gorgias lived in a time when there was a general trend
toward secularization in ancient Greece. We shall revisit this issue of
secularization in another context in Chapter Five when we consider the concept
of technS.
Polus: Dodds reports that Poluswas a Sicilian (11). He was probably a
student of Gorgias, also a Sicilian, or at least had a close association with him.
Polus apparently wrote a treatise on rhetoric or public speaking, which Plato
parodies at Gorgias 448c4-10 (Dodds 11; Renehan 69-71).^ In theGorgias, he is as
brash and impatient as his name ("colt") suggests. Some scholars have remarked
on what they perceive to be Polus' reprehensible moral character (Dodds 11-12),
yet Socrates twice declares himself philos to Polus. It is worth asking, then, why
Socrates should make a point of his friendly feelings for someone so base,
especially since these two declarations of friendship do not seem (at least to me)
to be ironic. Richard McKim argues that while Polus may on the surface
Aristotle, Metaphysics^ 981a 5-7.
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advocate some morally reprehensible ideas, he always answers Socrates frankly
with statements which he really believes to be true, and although he tries out
some of his rhetorical "tricks," he never attempts to evade the discussion in
order to avoid being refuted, as Callicles does at various points. In short, McKim
claims that Socrates considers Polus "salvageable" where Callicles is not (46,
46n33). There is some truth to McKim's argument, but I hope to show that
Socrates considers Callicles potentially salvageable as well. Polus' blatant honesty
seems more attributable to the fact that he is neither disciplined enough in his
thinking nor experienced enough in dialectic to "think ahead" to the
consequences of his answers; he simply responds with the first thing that comes
to mind. Socrates' use of the word phile seems more didactic than factual, used
to draw attention to Socrates' belief that refutation is an act of friendship.
Chaerephon: Chaerephon was a companion of Socrates, who tells us in
the Apology that Chaerephon was "a companion to the masses" (i.e., he was a
democrat) and was exiled during the brief oligarchy (21al-2). Socrates also says
elsewhere that his friend is excitable (Charmides 153b3) and impetuous (Apology
21a4). According to Dodds, Chaerephon appeared as a character in many
comedies, perhaps because he had a high-pitched voice which earned him the
nick-name "the bat" (6). In the Gorgias. Chaerephon is well-educated enough to
make literary allusions and sharp enough to use them in good-natured banter
(Dodds 189-190); he is less accomplished in dialectic, however, and still in need of
guidance from Socrates. He professes a fondness for conversation and speeches,
as did most Athenians, yet is easily distracted by the hustie and bustle of the
market-place. I would suggest, for reasons that will become more clear when
examining the prologue of the Gorgias, that Chaerephon functions as Plato's
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conception of a tjrpical upper-class Athenian democrat: essentially well-meaning
but inclined to intellectual shallowness.
rallirlpR! According to Dodds, there is no historical record of Callicles,
although he is the most prominent of Socrates' interlocutors. Dodds, however,
makes a reasonable case that Callicles is a bona-fide historical figure: All the
other participants in the dialogue are real;Callicles has relatives and friends
(hetairoi) who are historically real; and he has an eromenos, or love-object, who
is historically real. Dodds seesnothing to suggest that Callicles was not also
historically real and speculates that Callicles may have died a young man, too
soon to make a lasting impact on history (12-13).
In this dialogue, Callicles is an accomplished speaker, wealthy and
important enough to entertain a prominent rhetor-ambassador like Gorgias.
Apparently an aristocrat by birth (494el0) and certainly one by temperament, he
is politically very ambitious. He advocates a rather extreme form of hedonism
(see Klosko), an attitude which is foreshadowed throughout the dialogue by his
use of words associated with desire and gratification (for example, at 458dl-5).
The word epithumia in particular, which Callicles uses several times (447b5,
481cl, 484d7,491elO, 492a4), is associated with strong, lustful desires, especially in
Plato's works. According to Drew Hyland, Plato uses the word ^ in the Phaedrus,
the Symposium, and other dialogues —to denote an animal-like emotion which
has no component of reason {"Epcog" 37). Hyland describes it as "the lowest
faculty of the soul, the brute desire to possess what one lacks," associated with,
among other things, sexual gratification (40-41).35 These are the terms in which
Callicles thinks. Although Lamb calls Callicles "the typical Athenian democrat"
^However,as Dover pointsout inGreek Homosexuality (43nll),Plato'suseof thewordmaybe
different from popular usage.
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(252), I agree with Dodds that Lamb is misguided (13). As I have already
suggested, Chaerephon is more likely to fulfill that role. Indeed, Callicles is
hardly typical, if only because his desires for gratification, for charis, are so strong.
As the dialogue shows, that is part of both his danger and his promise; it is
because of this strong desire that Socrates can, and must, offer him an alternative
to the political life to which he aspires.
Socrates; In his conunentary on the Gorgias, Dodds declined to give a
character analysis ""either of the historical or of the Platonic Socrates" (16).
Indeed, the subject is so complex and the available literature so extensive that
such an analysis would itself fill many volumes, and it is not my intention to
rush in where Dodds feared to tread. However, I have already noted Dodds'
remark that Socrates is, or "becomes" a character much different from how he
appears in other Platonic dialogues (16). Other commentators have remarked on
the relative strangeness of Socrates' character, speculating that it may emphasize
the alienation of Socrates (and Plato) from the political culture of classical
Athens. Although these speculations are reasonable, I would also argue that the
Gorgias presents Socrates as an example of a way of life —philosophy —that is
alien to tradition but nevertheless a vital part of the community. In other words,
as L. B. Carter argues in a recent study of Athenian political quietism, Socrates
does not pursue a career as a politician, but he does pursue individuals in
conversations, asking questions on issues that are important to all (185). Like the
semi-public setting of the Gorgias. Socrates' life both is and is not public.
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CHAPTERS. CHARIS AND PHILIA IN PLATO^S GORGIAS
The Prologue: 447al-448cl0
Many of Plato's dialogues begin with a prologue in which some of the
main themes of the work are foreshadowed, and the Gorgias is one of these. The
prologue begins with Callicles' greeting and Socrates' response:
C: To join in a fight or a fray, as the saying is, Socrates, you have
chosen our time well enough.
S: Do you mean, according to the proverb, we have come too late
for a feast? (447al-4)
Callicles' greeting, which apparently gives a twist to a familiar saying,^^ is like a
small riddle, a test of Socrates' wit and a small display of Callicles' own verbal
quickness. The feast, as Callicles confirms, is Gorgias' epideictic performance,
which has just concluded. Thus Callicles provides the dialogue's first association
of public speaking with pleasure, the charis of the feast, which from Homeric
times was imderstood as full of merriment, fellowship, and the gratification of
appetite (MacLachlan 23). Indeed, Callicles seems well-satisfied with the "many
things and fine things" (polla . . .kai kala) ofGorgias' display. With this small
exchange, Callicles has suggested two social activities, fighting and feasting, and
identified Gorgias with the pleasure of the former and Socrates with the strife of
the latter —perhaps a humorous but pointed reference to Socrates' reputation for
contentiousness. But there is also a charis associated with the battlefield, and
Several commentators (Dodds, Thompson, Hamilton) compare this exchange to an English
proverb, Tirst atafeast, last ata fight/' but this association does not seem certain. In any case,
the phrase to legomenon, literally, "the thing said," indicates a familiar saying. According to
Hamilton (19n), Olympiodorus reports that the days on which Gorgias spoke were called "feast-
days," but perhaps this is a reference to the Gorgias itself.
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Socrates will later take up these two associations for his own purpose, showing
how there can be a kind of charis in striving, and drawing a distinction between
the fellowship of rhetoric and that of philosophy.
Socrates playfully accuses Chaerephon of "forcing" them to tarry in the
marketplace.®^ Chaerephon does not protest but says that he himself will cure
die injury he has inflicted: he claims that Gorgias will immediately give another
display put of friendship for him (philos gar moi Gorgias, For Gorgias is my
friend), if Socrates so desires (447a7-b4). This claim ofphilia seems odd. Perhaps
Gorgias is a friend of Chaerephon's, although their level of intimacy is not
clear.3® Nevertheless, can it be truly in the spirit of philia to demand of one's
friend, especially an elderly person such as Gorgias, that he perform once again
after having already given a lengthy display? Chaerephon's use of philia seems
boastful, perhaps, used in order to make himself look good in the eyes of the
assembled company, and possibly in the eyes ofSocrates. This Chaerephon
seems a well-educated and gregarious man, but shallow, eager to claim an
intimacy with a popular public figure likeGorgias. Chaerephon expects that
Gorgias will gratify his wishes, but his conception ofphilia seems lacking in any
real concern for the otherperson's welfare. It seeks only advantage. In this way,
Chaerephon embodies what Socrates considers the typical attitude of the
Athenian demos toward its orators, a relationship expanded upon in later
sections.
^^Although Chaerephon does not deny this, we suspect Socrates of being ironic, for Callicles is
incredulous that Socrates should want to attend one of Gorgias' displays. ("What, Chaerephon?
Has Socrates adesire to hear Gorgias?" 4A7h5r6) We are d\us not sure whether Socrates has really
been "detained" by Chaerephon orwhether he has simply gone along with his fnend, intending all
along to miss Gorgias' display. But given Socrates' famous dislike of long speeches, we susf)ect so.
®®There issome historical evidence that they knew each other, but no real evidence ofa close
relationship. See DK 82A.24.
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Like Chaerephon, Callicles also asserts that Gorgias will give a display, but
this time in return for Callicles' hospitality: "Gorgias is staying with me, and he
will give you a displajr" (447b8-10). In this way Callicles resembles the Callias of
Plato's Protagoras, who also associated with prominent intellectuals.
Traditionally, as we have seen, the bond between host and guest was an
important c/iarfs-relationship, and the expectation of reciprocal favor would be
an accepted value among aristocrats. But does Callicles have the right to exploit
the reciprocity of hospitality in order to satisfy the whims of others? Like
Chaerephon, Callicles assumes that Gorgias will give a display whenever
Socrates desires, apparently without regard for the wishes of Gorgias. Both men
make a claim of reciprocity, assuming that Gorgias owes them a charis,which is
to be repaid on demand. Although their personalities and their ambitions are
different in scale —Chaerephon is essentially harmless while Callicles is revealed
as a potential tyrant ~ both are willing to use Gorgias to further their own
interests, to make themselves seem important or powerful. Callicles, like
Chaerephon, offers Socrates a charis: to obtain for him one of Gorgias' displays,
another feast. But where Chaerephon speaks in terms of "curing" a wrong done,
Callicles thinks in terms of gratifying a desire (epithumed). Socrates, on the
other hand, will offer Callicles a friendship based on an imusual and paradoxical
charis.
In the last part of the prologue, there is an exchange between Polus and
Chaerephon that foreshadows more of the criticisms Socrates will make of both
rhetors and the rhetor-audience relationship. Chaerephon, with some
prompting from Socrates, attempts to question Gorgias but is interrupted by
Polus,who offers to take Gorgias' place on the grounds that "Gorgias must be
quite tired out" (448a8). Here, apparently, is the concern for Gorgias' well-being
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absent in Chaerephon, a concern we might reasonably expect from a student
solicitous of a respected teacher. Yet, as Plochman and Robinson point out, Polus
has not been invited into the conversation by Gorgias as Chaerephon has been
invited by Socrates, nor does he ask for advice from his teacher as Chaerephon
does (12). Polus' concern for Gorgias is suspect, and smacks of self-promotion,
not true concern for his friend. Polus does break in, however, and challenges
Chaerephon, who asks if Polus thinks he can answer "more excellently" (kallidn)
than the master Gorgias. Polus replies, "And what does that matter, if I should
satisfy you?" (448alO-b2). Unfortimately, Chaerephon willingly accepts this poor
substitute (11). The political relationship between politician and dimos which
Socrates will later criticize is thus embodied on a personal level in Polus and
Chaerephon —the one, a self-promoter seeking only to satisfy his audience
without regard for the best, and the other, a shallow thinker too eager to settle for
what is offered. Thus, the prologue introduces the issue of dvic, as well as
personal, philia.
We see, then, that while the word charis is yet to be uttered, the idea of
charis is present implicitly in the prologue. First, it is present in the traditional
conceptions of feasting and fighting. Second, it is present by association through
the concepts of personal and civic philia. Moreover, in addition to the
problematic relationship between rhetor and citizenry, the prologue also raises
the issue of education. Teacher and student can be said to have a relationship
which, through the bonding of individuals and the training of future citizens,
combines the charis of both personal and civic philia. Polus and Chaerephon
Sire, if not students, then at least close associates of Gorgias and Socrates. Yet both
men, self-centered and clumsy at argument, prove to be poor advertisements for
their mentors. What have Polus and Chaerephon received from their teachers?
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What charis, if any, flows between teacher and student? The conversation
between Socrates and Gorgias begins to explore this issue by inquiring into the
nature of rhetoric — what the student receives from the rhetorician.
Goigias: The Charis of Rhetorical Power, 448dl-461b2
Asking the "What is it" question (ti esti) is Socrates' standard procedure in
many Platonic dialogues, and Socrates' goal in the conversation with Gorgias is
to seek an answer to the question "What is rhetoric?" (448e9-449a5). In
particular, Socrates wants to know what kind of art, or techne, Gorgias professes
to have. This question is important to the present discussion of charis because
rhetorical ability —the power in operation between rhetor and audience —is
what is given or transmitted from teacher to student. The skills of rhetoric --
whatever they may be -- are thus in themselves a kind of gift, a charis which the
teacher bestows on the student, and Socrates wishes to know the exact nature of
that gift. Socrates himself puts the "what is it" question in terms of education at
445c7-445d7, when he supposes that many of those in the audience wish to be
Gorgias' students and are asking themselves, "What shall we get, Gorgias, by
coming to hear you?" Although the term charis is still yet to come, it is again
implicit in the discussion which follows. There, Socrates begins to askwhat
charis the rhetorician brings to the reciprocal relationship of teacher-student.
What will tiie student have or be able to do when the transaction is complete?
In an assertion which introduces the issue of power, Gorgias claims that
his artis a cause of freedom for human beings at large^^ and also away for
^odds (202), Irwin (19), and Hamilton all translate this first portion as eitiier freedom "for
himself" or freedom "for himself" butdo not explain how the plural construction "tois autois
anthropois" yields a translation in the singular. Surely this must mean "human beings
themselves," or "humankind." Plochman and Robinson (26), Lamb, and Woodhead use the plural.
a man
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individuals to dominate in their dties (452d7-9). As this assertion stands, there
appears to be a tension between the twohalves of the claim, as Plochman and
Robinson rightly point out. Domination for one means less freedom for others
(26). It is worthwhile, however, to examine this apparent contradiction and to
speculate on what Gorgias might be referring to when he says that his art is a
cause of freedom to mankind at large. For freedom would seem to be a large and
valuable charis indeed. A due, I think, comes from a line in Polus' speech at
448c6-7. At this point Polus says that "experience conducts the course of our life
according to art (techne), but inexperience according to chance (tuche)" This
opposition between chance or luck on the one hand, and art or skill on the other,
traditional in Greek thought, helps explain not only how rhetoric could bring
freedom to all human beings but also why the concept of techne was so
important to both Socrates and the sophists and rhetors in Plato's dialogues.
For the Greeks, tuche meant the contingencies of human life, those things
which happen to us, not necessarily at random, but without our own
intervention or intention (Dover, GFM 138). As Martha Nussbaum puts it,
"What happens to a person by luck will be just what does not happen through
his or her own agency, what just happens to him, as opposed to what he does or
makes" (3, emphasis hers). Chance or luck, dosely allied with fate, was much
more psychologically present to and far more forbidding for the andent Greeks
than it is for twentieth-century modems, Bernard Williams notes that for the
archaic Greeks in particular, "human beings were largely powerless against fate
and chance .... they [fate and chance] belong to an order of things that has the
shape and the discouraging effect of a hostile plan, a plan that remains incurably
hidden from us" (150).
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To be so deeply subject to chance is to possess little control over one's life.
A techni, however, gives us hope for a measure of control. A techni is any skill,
craft, or art, "intelligent skill in a very broad sense" (Roochnik 18). Indeed, the
concept is broad enough to include such things as painting or sculpture,
mathematics, engineering, carpentry, weaving, and wood or metal working. It is
this systematic use of himian intelligence which is deployed against chance.
Consider a simple example. If I try to make a shelter for myself by proceeding at
random, I shall probably fail outright or my final product will be inferior. If I
leam ca^entry, however, I can produce dwellings reliably and predictably, and I
can teach others to be carpenters as well.*^ Because of my skill, I and my friends
will be less subject to the whims of the weather, our future more secure. I cannot
stop the rain, but I can stop my gettingwet. TheGreatMyth of Plato'sProtagoras
is about the reception of such technai from the gods and the difference they made
to human civilization. Before art, life proceeded, as in Polus' commonplace,
according to chance. But techni, "a deliberate application of human intelligence
to some part of the world," helps us mitigate the effects of chance and makes us
more secure (Nussbaum 95).
In this sense, then, techni gives human beings a measure of freedom —
freedom from chance and contingency. It is this general sort of freedom that
imderlies Gorgias' claim that rhetoric brings freedom to himian beings at large.
More specifically, however, this will include freedom from the contingencies
and dangers that arise from dealing with other human beings. These social
dangers can be regarded asabstract, as inConsign/sclaim thatGorgias' rhetoric
brings freedom from the t5Tanny of one discourse (see Chapter Four, page 28), or
^ fact, the word techne is descended from the word tekton, "woodworker" (Roochnik, Tragedy
18). For general discussions oftechne, see Roochnik, Tragedy 18-21, and Nussbaum 94-99.
Nussbaum's book examines the connection between tuche and Greek ethics.
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they can be considered in a more concrete way as freedom from the practical
actions of others. Especially in Athens, for example, citizens were subject to
lawsuits of all types, including, if one was wealthy, malidous accusations by
sycophants hoping to profit from their victims' misfortunes. This type of danger
was not remote. When Callicles warns that someone might haul Socrates into
court on a trumped-up charge, he is speaking of fairly common occurrences in
classical Athens (Carter 105-109; Ober 173-174). If one could not defend oneself,
one was at another's m^cy. Thus, freedom for the Athenians would include, as
Irwin says, freedom from being "dependent on the power or goodwill of others"
(116). To be so dependent was, for marly Greeks, to live a life little better than
that of a slave. But rhetoric could give a measure of control over human
contingency by allowing one to defend oneself in court. This is the charts of
rhetoric which Callicles will later emphasize; Socrates, on the other hand, will
try tease out the implications of being completely free from harm.
We see, then, how "freedom," both broadly and more narrowly conceived,
could be claimed as a charis of rhetoric and of the rhetorician-student
relationship. The other half of Gorgias' claim involves personal power, and it is
the ability of individuals to rule which Gorgias emphasizes: the doctor, the
trainer, the moneygetter will be "as slaves" to the competent rhetor who can
persuade themultitude (452e5-9). This is a dominant theme in Gorgias' praise of
rhetoric, occurring again at 456b7-c6, where Gorgias declares that a skilled rhetor
could beat out all comers for any appointed position in the dty, and again at
459c4-6, where he asks Socrates if it is not a convenience that learning justone
art will make one "not inferior" to other skilled workers (demiourge). Gorgias
asserts, however, that although rhetoric is a great power, encompassing nearly all
other powers (456a9-10-bl), it should be used "justl/' (dikaios), against one's
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enemies and other wrongdoers, not against one's philoi —parents, other
relatives, friends (456dl-457c4). This notion that acting justly means helping
fnends and harming enemies was a code of behavior widely held, if often
criticized, by the ancient Greeks (Blundell, 26-59 and passim; Dover 180-184;
Pearson 141-142,161-179). It is this traditional definition of jiasticewhich Socrates
refutes in the first book of the Republic.
Thus, Gorgias implies that his students will obtain a great charts by
coming to study with him; they will obtain a techne which will bring them
freedom and power. But earlier Gorgias had claimed, imder Socrates'
questioning, that rhetoric was about justice and injustice (454b8-9); in other
words, the subject matter of the rhetorical techne is justice and injustice. Now,
however, Gorgias proclaims the moral neutrality of rhetoric itself; like the skills
associated with combat sports, it can be used for either good or ill, depending, on
the character of the speaker. The speaker is the one who should be held
responsible for his use of rhetoric, not the art itself or the teacher of the art.
Accordingly, Socrates pursues the justice angle and goads Gorgias into claiming
that if students do not already know what is just, he will teach them (460a4-5).^i
Socrates finds this incompatible with Gorgias' admission that some people might
use rhetoric unjustly. In otherwords, if rhetoric is a techni (which by tradition
has a definite and reliably teachable subject matter), and if, as Gorgias seems to
claim at 454b8-9, the subject matter of that art is justice and injustice, then if the
rhetorician claims to have this techne, he should be able to teach students to be
just. But Gorgias has just admitted that students of rhetoric may in fact act
xmjustly; using the traditional conception of techne, Gorgias has been caught in a
•^^This particular statement seems incompatible with statements made about the historical
Gorgias, whosupposedly claimed not to teach justice. OnthisseeMcKim's article.
49
contradiction. liius, in this exchange with Gorgias, Socrates has begun to
question whether the rhetorician can actually provide a valuable charis to
potential students. In other words, Gorgias claims, or at least implies, that he has
a techni, a skill which would be a great charis in itself and a producer of charis
for others. Yet, regardless of the freedom and power that rhetoric may bestow
upon the student, if the subject matter of his art is justice, but students of rhetoric
act imjustly, perhaps the teacher of rhetoric does not after all posses a techni
which he can pass on to his students. And if he cannot teach students to be just,
then perhaps the charis that the rhetorician offers is not in fact the great charis
that he claims it is.^^
At this point, moreover, Socrates begins to suggest that there might be a
charis of dialectic, of the elenchus, which is not conventional but nevertheless
there. Socrates begins by remarking on the difficulty of communication in
discussion. It is hard to distinguish the issues at hand, he says, and people often
get annoyed when they are challenged, thinking they are being personally
attacked. The spirit of inquiry is lost and all become contentious; soon even the
audience is disgusted (457c5-e2). Clearly, then, the charis-pieasuie traditionally
associated with speech is sometimes lacking in dialectic. However, Socrates says
that he would continue questioning Gorgias "with pleasure" (hededs) if Gorgias
is the same sort of man as Socrates himself; someone who would be refuted
"with pleasure" if he says anything untrue, andwhowould refute anyone else
"with pleasure" if they said anything untrue (458al-5). Socrates' emphasis on
pleasure in this passage suggests an alternative charis-pleasure in dialectic.
But even if rhetoric isnota techne which produces jusrice, might rhetors still notuseit to obtain
the charis of freedom and powerwhich Gorgias has also claimed as a benefit of rhetoric? Socrates
will take up this issue in the final two sections of the dialogue by undermining the value ofthe
rhetor's alleged h'eedom and power.
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Socrates does not mean that being refuted is in itself a pleasurable activity but
that being in a better state than before is pleasurable. Indeed, to be refuted is a
gain or an advantage (kerdos) (461a3-4). Socrates takes pleasure in refuting or
being refuted, that is, purging oneself or others from "the greatest evil" (kakou ta
megistou) —having a false opinion on the questions at hand (458a6-bl). As the
next conversation with Polus will make clear, Socrates believes it is a pleasure to
improve one's soul, or to improve someone else's, because it is a good (agathos).
It is a greater good, however, to have one's own soul improved.
As he does so often, Socrates makes this suggestion about dialectic in the
form of a paradox. Dialectic is often not conventionally pleasurable to the
participants —indeed, it can be quite painful —and cannot be called a traditional
charis. Yet it does provide its own kind of pleasure because of the benefits it
provides and so is a charis after all. A similar kind of paradoxical charis which
breaks apart the two notions of pleasure and favor can be found in Aeschylus'
Agamemnon. At one point in this play, the chorus considers that all the
violence and suffering of the events of the Trojan War may be part of the order
of things decreed by Zeus:
it is Zeus who has put men on the way to wisdom by establishing as
a valid law 'By suffering they shall win understanding'. Instead of
sleep there trickles before the heart the pain of remembrance of
suffering: even to the unwilling discretion (sophronein) comes.
There is, I think, a charis from the gods, who, using force (hiaids), sit
on the dread bench of the helmsman. (176-183)^
^?The Greektextis a 1962 reprintofEduardFraenkers 1950 Oxford edition. The translation is
Fraenkel's.
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Here we have a picture of a divine charis, a charis which is not conventionally
pleasant In fact, it is composed of suffering in the greatest degree. Yet through
this suffering comes learning (pathei mathos), a gift from the gods. As Fraenkel
remarks, "In our first impression the suffering . .. seems anything but charis; it is
only in its results, in what we learn by it, that it proves to be a favour" (112).^
Socrates suggests much the same of his elenchus; it is a charis which is not a
charis, a favor which is not a pleasure, like a violent gift h'om the gods. In fact,
Callicles will later acciase Socrates of being hiaios, "forceful, overbearing" (505d5).
In this first conversation with Gorgias, the issue of favor-exchange in
commimication has been raised. Both Socrates and Gorgias imply or suggest a
charis associated with their respective discpurses. Gorgias, by accepting Socrates'
assumption that rhetoric is a techne, implies that he can provide his students
with a great charis, the power of rhetoric which allows us both to dominate other
human beings (presumably our enemies) and to provide our friends with help.
And as CaUicles has implied in the prologue, this charis of power is combined
with the charis-pieasvie of the feast. Socrates, however, by driving Gorgias into
contradiction, hints that Gorgias might not be able to make good on his offer of
charis. Socrates' charis is quite different from that of Gorgias. Apparently it is
not traditionally pleasurable, yet it does provide a charis, the greatest benefit of
all —being delivered of false opinion. Moreover, instead of emphasizing power,
Socrates suggests that one is dependent on someone else for the greatest charis.
Indeed, throughout the rest of the dialogue, Socrates will urge his interlocutors
to refute him if they can. To Polus, for instance, he will say that he will be
^Naturally there isdisagreement about the interpretation of this passage. In addition to
Fraenkel's commentary, seeMacLachlan fora morecomplete discussion of charis in theOresteia.
particularly page 126n2 for a brief summary ofvarious points ofview onlines 176-183. I arri deeply
indebted lx)th to MacLachlan and to Fraenkel for the idea of the paradoxical charis in the
Agamemnon. Asfar asI know, theextension oftheconcept to tiie Gorgias ismy own.
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grateful (charis echo) if he is refuted. He implies that the proper charts is
correction, which will be reciprocated with the charis of gratitude. But at this
point, Socrates has not said why rhetoric does not or cannot provide this same
charis. This he takes up in the next section with Polus, where the concept of the
paradoxical charis will be reversed and applied to rhetoric.
Polus: The Paradox Reversed, 461b2-481b5
At this juncture, Polus breaks in and accuses Socrates of shaming Gorgias
into admitting that he would have to teach his students justice (461b2). So begins
the conversation with Polus, wherein Socrates gives his own views (or so he
says) on the nature of rhetoric. In doing so he elaborates on what the audience
gains from the rhetor^hearer relationship, while Polus' reply suggests a benefit to
the rhetor. When Polus asks Socrates what kind of techne he considers rhetoric
to be, Socrates says no art at all but a "familiarity" in producing charis and
hedone, gratification and pleasure.^ Polus immediately asks Socrates if he
therefore thinks rhetoric is "a fine" thing (kalos) since it is an ability to gratify
(charizomai) people (462b3-cl0). Polus' use of the word kalos suggests the kind of
exchange he expects from the rhetor-audience relationship. In Irwin's view, the
word kalos is used in a very general sense in this passage, and it is not clear if
Polus thinks rhetoric is kalos "because it benefits us , or because it benefits other
people, or both" (130). Certainly this passage is a bit ambiguous because of the
ambiguity of the word kalos itself. Being useful is one reason something or
someone might be called kalos, ^ but often the notion of public approval is
^"Familiarity" is Plochman and Robinson's translation ofthe Greek empeiria (12), which means,
generally, "experience" (L&S). Terms used by other translators include "routine" (Woodhead);
"knack gained by pcperience" (Hamilton); and "habitude" (Lamb).
^Asa term inpopular Greek usage, kalos can also refer to the physical characteristics which
produce beauty in someoneor something. Socrates includesthismeaningof kaJos later in the
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implicit in the meaning of the word, and this sense of public acclaim is
important in the present context. According to K. J. Dover, kalos often refers in
Greek oratory to "any action, behaviour or achievement which evokes any kind
of favourable reaction and praise," anything which brings the agent honor or
respect (timi). Words close in meaning in English are "admirable, creditable,
honourable" (70). It is certainly possible that Polus considers rhetoric to be kalos
for this reason, and that he thinks of charts —which has not been specified here
as anything other than gratification in a general sense ~ as the rhetor's
contribution to the audience, in return, perhaps, for respect or honor. This is
really a very traditional association of charis and eloquence with respect or
honor, as we have seen earlier in the passages from Homer. It is not clear,
however, exactly what Polus has in mind at this point. It only becomes apparent
as the conversation proceeds that Polus has left out altogether the idea of mutual
respect from the equation and is fixed on the power of the rhetor to do what he
likes and to avoid the consequences of his actions.
In response to Polus' clumsy questioning (with a little help from Gorgias),
Socrates further describes rhetoric as a species of flattery (kolakeia), along with
sophistry, cookery, and cosmetics. These four pseudo-arts are opposed to their
counterparts justice, legislation, medicine, and gymnastics. Socrates outlines his
objections to flattery thus:
Now these four [the real arts]... are noticedby the art of flattery
which, I do not say with knowledge (gignosko), but by speculation
(stochazomai), divides herself into four parts, and then, insinuating
herself into each of those branches, pretends to be that into which
she has crept, and cares nothing forwhat is thebest, but dangles
controversial section at 474d3-475e8.
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what is most pleasant for the moment as a bait for folly and
deceives it into thinking that she is of the highest value. (464c5-d4)
On Socrates' accoimt, then, rhetoric and sophistry (and the other forms of
"flatter)^') are shameful for two reasons: 1) on ethical grounds, since they aim at
what is pleasing, without distinction between good and bad; and 2) on epistemic
grounds, since they do not know but only guess, that is, they are alogos or
irrational, imable to give an account of what they are or how they proceed (464e2-
465a7). According to Socrates, the soul is "in charge of" (ephistemi) the body and
can "survey and distinguish" (katatheoreo kai diakrind) things —such as
medicine from cookery, art from pseudo-art —that the body cannot If the soul
were not in conimand of the body , but the body were left to try to distinguish on
the basis of charis-pleasuie (tais charisi), everything would be as jumbled up as
the pre-ordered cosmos of Anaxagoras (465c9-d7) ^7 Rhetoric is the cookery of
the soul (465d7-9) and provides charis for the soul. At least two questions arise.
First, what does Socrates mean by "flattery," and what is the charis provided to
the soul by this flattery? Second, if the soul makes distinctions on behalf of the
body, how does the soul distinguish for itself what is good for itself? Is the soul
"in command" of itself? In order to answer the first question, a brief excursion
into Attic comedy will be helpful. The second question introduces the issue of
sdphrosunif which will be discussed more fully in Socrates' conversation with
Callicles.
According to Socrates, the pleasure which rhetoric gives the audience is
that of flattery, kolakeia. Although flattery is certainly not a concept alien to our
time, we might shed some light on the impression Socrates wishes to convey by
^^Anaxagoras believed that the cosmos was organized by the action of Mind (Nous) on an
undifferentiated mixture of "thin^."
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considering the traditions of ancient comic drama. The flatterer or kolaxs
(sometimes called a parasite or parasitos )appears in ancient comedy as a stock
character, a clever yet pathetic figure who cadges meals from rich patrons in
exchange for fawning behavior and witty table-talk (Norwood 102-104).
According to the accoimt in the Deipnosophists of Athenaeus, the parasite was
originally a quasi-religious figure appointed by the state who assisted priests in
ritual sacrifices, shared in feasting on the sacrificed animal, and performed other
duties connected with the commimal food-stores. The idea of the person who
dines at another's table was eventually applied to hangers-on and passed into
comic poetry as the flatterer or kolaxs (vi.234c-237a).
The first known comic portrayal of the parasite is in Epicharmus' Hope or
Wealth,^ in which a parasite supplies this description of his life:
I dine with whoever wishes ~ he needs only to invite me; yes, and
with the man who doesn't wish— no need of invitation. At table, I
am witty (charieis Veimi) and cause much laughter. I praise our
host, and if anyone wishes to contradict him, I insult the man and
take the quarrel on myself. Then, full of meat and drink, I depart.
No servant accompanies me with a lantern, but I trudge along all by
myself, sttmibling in the dark. Whenever I meet the watch I thank
my stars that they are satisfied with thrashing me. And when I
reach home all to pieces I lie without bedclothes, not noticing their
absence so long as the potent vnne enfolds my brain.
Eupolis, too, a contemporary and rival of Aristophanes, puts the kolaxs to use.
In his comedy Flatterers (Kolakes), a chorus of flatterers describe their typical day:
^^crates mentions Epicharmus with approval at Theaetetus 152e.
Greek text and translation, see Norwood 103.
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Once there [the agora], whenever I espy some one with no brains
but plenty of money, I am at him instantly. If my plutocrat lets fall a
remark, I praise it (epaind) vehemently, filled with pretended
rapture. Next we make off dispersedly to dine at the table of others,
where the flatterer must straightway discharge a flood of wit
(charienta) or be flung out into the street. ^
If anything, Eupolis presents the more derogatory description of kolakeia, since
he emphasizes the contempt the flatterer has for his victim. This comedy, of
which only a few fragments are extant, holds particular fascination for historians
of rhetoric and philosophy since it is apparently a send-up of Callias, the rich
Athenian who entertained sophists like Protagoras (who appears as a diaracter in
the play). Indeed, as Norwood remarks, Eupolis' play seems to be a comedic
"analogue" of Plato's Protagoras (190).
Although we can't know the exact degree to which both Socrates and Plato
himself were influenced by these comedies, this picture of rhetoric as flattery
seems to owe a great deal to the comic tradition; it is reasonable also to assume
that Plato's audience, if not Socrates' audience, would have made the connection,
if only because Eupolis' play was quite famous, having won the first prize for
comedy in 421 B.C.E. The two poets quoted above present the flatterer as a
hiunan being who makes a living sponging off rich but dull fellow-citizens in
exchange for pleasurable, c/wris-filled speech —praise and sparkling
conversation. The analogy between the flatter of comedy and the rhetor of the
polis is plain enough. What obtains between a flatterer and his patron is
(apparently) extended by Eupolis to the relationship between a Protagoras and a
^^orwood 191. Norwood doesnotdiscuss allthefragmentofthecomic poets. For flie complete
Greek text of tiie fragments, see Poetae Comid Graed. Ed. Colin Austin and Rudolf Kassel, Berlin:
Walter de Gniyter, 1983 —.
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Gallias; Socrates takes it still further and brings in the relationship between
rhetor and citizen. The demagogue or popular orator must continue to satisfy
the people with praise and sparkling oratory or risk being thrown out —
ostracized. Underlying the comedy, then, is a commentary on both personal and
civicphilia. No true friendship or fellowship exists between the flatterer and his
patron ~ and, by extension, between rhetor and citizen ~ for the former holds his
patron in contempt while revealing himself to be a person of slavish habits.^^
Nor is the affection a patron holds for the kolax anything but fleeting. If the
flatterer cannot provide adequate entertainment, he is cast out. The apparent
fellowship that exists between the flatterer and his dinner companions is a
veneer made to seem deeper by the charis of the clever speeches and the ensuing
laughter of the group. Thus, the charis of the flatterer's friendship —the praise,
the witty talk —is like the charis given by cosmetics —something added on. It is
impermanent and allotrios (extraneous, unnatural, foreign), not oikeios —that
which is one's own (465b2-8). Plato's Socrateswill exploit these features of the
flatterer most emphatically in his conversation with Callicles, where the issue of
civic philia is taken up explicitly for the first time.
Charis in a more specific context obtains in the case of the law courts,
which Socrates considers to be rhetoric's legitimate arena. In Chapter Three, we
saw that charis was part of many defense speeches in Athenian courts. As part of
his defense, a speaker would often list the services and gifts he had provided for
the community. In essence, these are speeches of praise directed at oneself —they
are "epideictic" in that they attempt to display both the good character of the
accused and his value to the community. On the basis of these good works, the
5lCf AristoUe, NE Vm.viii.
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defendant asks the jury for charts, a favor reciprocated, as in this example from
Lysias:
Our benefactions to you were not intended to make financial gain
for ourselves, but to ensure that if we were ever in danger we might
ask from you the charis we deserved and receive it (xx30).
Although this soimds suspiciously like an attempt to bribe the jury into ignoring
evidence, we should also bear in mind the character of Athenian trials. There
most likely were some attempts at pure bribery, but K, J. Dover reminds us that
in ancient Athens there were no modem methods of determining guilt and
innocence in a trial - no fingerprints or DNA tests, no paper trails or tape
recordings, no cross-questioning of witnesses. The prosecutor and the accused
simply spoke for themselves and called whatever witnesses each could muster
for his own side. (This is the point of Socrates' remark at 471e3-5, when he says
that Polus attempts to refute him "in rhetorical fashion.") In such
circumstances, the ethos of both defendant and prosecutor, as well as that of the
witnesses, could be the decisive factor in a jury's verdict (GPM 292-3; Greek
Homosexuality 14). As Dover remarks, appeals to charis give the impression
that the defendant is saying, " 'Never mind the charge; let me off because I have
been a good friend to you and deserve your gratitude' " (GPM293). It is this plea
for charis in the name of philia which Socrates will later disdain. However, it is
not the act of giving favors in itself to which Socrates objects —it is the nature of
the "favor" given. The next section of Socrates' conversation with Polus
examines the nature of that favor.
So far, Socrates has presented a picture of rhetoric-as-flattery that
challenges Polus' conception of rhetoric as something which brings respect and
honor. On the contrary, suggests Socrates, rhetoric, because it is a species of
59
flattery, involves behavior that is shameful, like the behavior of a flatterer. In
this way, Socrates has reversed the paradox of charis originally suggested in the
conversation with Gorgias. There, dialectic was presented as a charis which is
not a charis —a favor which is not a pleasure. On the other hand, through the
analogy with flattery and false friendship, the first part of the conversation with
Polus describes rhetoric as the opposite paradoxical charis—a pleasure which is
not a favor. In the rest of this section, Socrates continues the paradox of charis by
returning to the theme of power —the charis that Gorgias suggests he gives to his
students. Socrates attempts to show that this power is not really power at all and,
hence, not a true favor —rhetoric provides only a veneer of power. Socrates will
also return to and elaborate the notion that the real charis is correction; this he
does by comparing not only his own elenchus but also punishment in the law
courts to treatment by a doctor. As indicated in Chapter Two (pages 7-8), this
portion of the dialogue is problematic for many scholars because the logic of
much of the dialectical exchange is questionable. However, since Vlastos, Irwin,
McKim, and others have already analyzed in detail the various logical problems,
I will not revisit them all here. I will merely state my agreement with both Kahn
and McKim that Socrates' strategy is basically both ad hominem and
psychological, and give some reasons why this type of ad hominen argument is
in keeping with the criticisms of rhetorical charis that Socrates has made to this
point.
Polus apparently believes that great power is being able to do anything one
thinks fit, escaping any bad consequences of one's actions —in particular, not
suffering pimishment (470al-8). So then, says Socrates, if doing what one thinks
fit brings advantage, then this is not just a good thing but also the possession of
great power (470a9-12). But, says Socrates, it is actually of more advantage to the
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agent to act justly than to act unjustly (470c2-4). This belief, that acting justly is
always better for the agent than acting unjustly, RichardMcKim calls the
"Socratic Axiom" (35). According to McKim, Socrates' primary goal in this
section is to persuade Polus that, despite Polus' protestations to the contrary, he
already believes in the Socratic Axiom. Indeed, McKim points out that Polus,
further on in the discussion at 477b4-c7, quite readily accepts the proposition that
"that committing injustice engenders sickness of soul and that this is far more
shameful than poverty or bodily sickness" (47). Moreover,McKim argues that
Socrates "is convinced that we all share the Axiom by nature as our deepest
moral belief" (36). In other words, what Socrates is attempting to do is to elicit
from Polus what he truly believesby nature ~ a belief that, like the charis of a
body made strong by gymnastics, is oikeios, his own. On the one hand, then,
Socrates is attempting to draw out from Polus a set of beliefs that are "his own>"
and not another's. This is why Socrates makes such a point of disregarding the
opinions of the masses and chiding Polus for his rhetorical strategy of appealing
to popular opinion. On the other hand, in yet another paradox, Socrates
indicates that the belief he is attempting to elicit from Polus, that acting justly is
always beneficial for the agent, is actually shared by all others. As Charles H.
Kahn argues, although Polus' view that the tyrant is unjust may be merely a
reflection of popular opinion (as Callicles charges), "the recognition that this is
the popular view connects Polus . .. with the 'deposit of truth' that perceives
criminal acts as destructive not only for the society but ultimately for the
criminal himself (117, emphasis his).^^
5^1 am indebted to Francisco J.Gonzalez, whose essay 'Tlato's Lysis: An Enactment of Philosophical
IQnship" impressed upon me the importance of tooikeion, that which is one's own. Although
Gonzalez' essay analyzes a different dialogue, I believe that his discussion of oikeios (and related
terms) is compatible with mine.
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Socrates' goal, then, is to persuade Polus to discover in a "private"
conversation what he also holds in common with others —that doing wrong is
bad for both commimity and individual and that escaping pimishment is the
worst evil of all. At this point, Socrates uses an analogy comparing his elenchus
to medical treatment: "Do not shrink from answering, Polus; you will get no
hurt by it: but submityourself bravely to the argument, as to a doctor, and reply
yes or no to my question" (475d8-ll). Socrates thus returns to the theme, begun
in the conversation with Gorgias, that to be refuted is a great charis which brings
relief from the greatest evil, having a false opinion on matters of the utmost
importance. Indeed, he repeatedly invitesPolus to do the same for him. At one
point Polus incredulously tells Socrates that a child could refute him; Socrates
replies that he "will be grateful to the child (to pais charis echo), and equally to
you, if you refute me and rid me of foolery (apallasso phluaria). Come, do not
grow weary in well-doing (euergeted) towards your friend (philos), but refute
me." (470c8-ll). This time, however, Socrates imites the "private" charis of
dialectic with the political charis of just pimishment through the medical
analogy, which is used throughout the remainder of this section to compare jiist
pimishment with the pain of cautery and incision Since being unjust or wicked
is the greatest evil of all because it makes the soul ill as sickness does the body,
tiien everyone should attempt to relieve themselves of being imjust, even
though the treatment is no more pleasant than a trip to the doctor (478a-e). Once
again, the notion that a true benefit is not always pleasurable breaks the
traditional union of charis as favor and charis as pleasure.
This being so, asks Socrates, what is the use of rhetoric, since all it
apparently does is allow wrongdoers to escape punishment by equipping
themselves with "money and friends and the ability to speak persuasivel)^'?
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(478cl-4,480al-5). Socrates concludes that rhetoric is of no use in defending
injustice since avoidance of penalty leaves the soul in the worst condition. On
the one hand, says Socrates, rhetoric might be useful if one were to prosecute self
or friends or family (480b8-d8) since being relieved of evil is a great benefit. On
the other hand, if we are supposed to harm our enemies, we should let them go
imptmished (480e6-481bl). This as another startling paradox. Byshifting the
focus of "help" and "harm" to the soul, Socrates comes to a conclusion that flies
in the face of a commonly accepted notion of justice in ancient Greece: that one
should help one's friends and harm one's enemies. Part of the Homeric heroic
code, this view of justice was still current in the classical period (Dover 180-184;
and Blundell passim).^^ According to Socrates, however, one should help one's
friends by prosecuting them and harm one's enemies by letting them go free.
This apparent upending of common sense is too much for Callicles, who enters
the conversation at 481b6-7. Thus begins the final section of the Gorgias. Here
Plato brings together all the strands of charis that have been running through the
didogue, sometimes only as subtext. The charis of personal, educational, and
civic philia are all revisited, this time more explicitly, and the possibility of a
charis allied to philosophical philia is explored.
Callicles: An Offer of Philosophical Friendship, 481b6-527e9
Callicles first asks Chaerephon, and then Socrates himself, if he is serious
or joking, expressing himself, as he does so often, in terms of desireiepithumed)
(481cl). Socrates immediately attempts to persuade Callicles that people who
share things in common have an easier time communicating because of it
53"Helping friendsand harming enemies" isoneofthe firstdefinitions ofjiistice tobe discussed and
discarded in Book 1 of the Republic.
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(481c8-d3). In tWs case, Socrates appeals to one of the primary charts
relationships in ancient Greek culture, and one of the most important images in
Platonic philosophy: the erotic love of beauty in the form of the amorous
pursuit of a boy or yotingman (eromenos) by an older man (erastes). According
to David M. Halperin, this kind of pederastic love was not considered shocking
Or even remarkable among most Athenians of Plato's time, and neither man nor
boy were censured for this relationship as long as accepted rituals and rules of
conduct were observed (91-94),^ Socrates says that he and Callicles are both
enamored of two things: Socrates of Aldbiades and philosophy, and Callicles
"the Athenian Demus" and "the son of Pyrilampes," (who also happens to be
named Demus) (481d3-7). In other words, according to Socrates, Callicles is as
infatuated with the Athenian people as he would be of another eromenos,
changing his opinion to match that of his favorite. Indeed, says Socrates, "if
anyone showed surprise at the strangeness of the things you are constantly
saying imder that influence, you would probably tell him, if you chose to speak
the truth, that unless somebody makes your favourite stop speaking thus, you
will never stop speaking thus either" (481e8-482a3). Philosophy, however,
unlike the other beloved of Socrates, always says the same thing (482a8-bl).
The analogy that Socrates draws between Callicles' erotic life and his
political ambitions works in several ways. The first and most obvious way is that
Callicles is in thrall to the public as if to a loved one, changing his own opinion
to please that of his beloved —this makes him akin to the flatterer discussed
^Attitudes towards so-called "passive" maleprostitution werefar more hostile, witness Callicles'
reaction to Socra:tes' reference to it (494e2-9). The penetration of a male citizen's body was
anathema, and anyone engaging in passive homosexual intercourse could be stripped of his
citizenship rights. Intercourse in pederastic relationships, at least ideally, was apparently
intercniral, to spare the boy this degradation. The Athenian attitude towards sexual ^havior in
general is complex. See Dover, Greek Homosexuality and Halperin, One Hundred Years of
Homosexuality for the complications and political implications of Greek homosexual behavior.
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earlier. Second, in erotic relationships, the man would often brings gifts to or
perform services for the boy, hopmg both to convince the boy of his sincerity and
to persuade the boy to give him sexual charis out of gratitude and philia '^^
affection O;)over 92). This "bringing of gifts" will later become the basis of
Socrates' criticism of the "walls and ships" that politicians bestow on the people.
Third, as in other c/wns-relationships such as that between husband and wife,
the man-boy relationship is not, according to Dover, one of "reciprocated
sentiment of equals but of the pursuit of those of lower status by those of higher
status" (84). The man, in other words, has a higher social status than the boy,
just as Callicles, an upper-class Athenian, has a higher social status than the
general population.^^ Socrates implies here what he later says more openly, that
the Athenian people are like children. This erotic analogy is neither subtle nor
original and has a comic effect. It would have been familiar to Plato's audience —
and perhaps to Socrates' audience ~ from the Knights of Aristophanes, in which
another "Demus" is courted by two rival erflsfaf-politicians, who urge him to
"find out which loves you best/ And so decide, and give that man your love
(747-748).56
We now have two comic analogies comparing political relationships with
other social relationships, both involving charis and some type of love or
friendship. In the first case, the charis of the flatterer's speech and the charis of
®®I do notmean to implythat in erotic relationships themanwasupper dass and theboylower
class, only that children in general, like women, had inferior social emd political status in ancient
Greece. For an account of how Plato might be challenging the traditional Greek conception of man-
boy erotidsm, see David M. Halperin, "Plato and Erotic Redprodty," Classical Antiquity. 5
(1986): ^-80.
^In the Knights.Demus is an oldman(geron), but thesausage-seller describes himas being"like
^e eromenoi" (737). Political commentary in ancient comedy is often highly sexualized, and there
is evidence that Plato and other writers of Socraticdialogues continue tMs practice. SeeMadeleine
Henry, Prisoner of History, especially pages 19-56;and Halperih, One Hundred Years of
Homosexuality, pages 113-151.
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the friendship between flatterer and patron are deceitful and false, and they
obscure the true nature of the relationship. They are transient, lasting only as
long as the feast. In the case of erotic charts, however, the case is somewhat
different, and while Socrates' analogy is comic, its indictment of Callicles is not
so harsh. In fact, Socrates identifies himself as being an erastes and a lover of
philosophy. Socrates implies that he and Callicles are alike in at least this
respect they are both men of Eros, but the objects of their respective desires are
different. This is another indication that Socrates does not consider charis in
itself to be bad; there may be a good ^nd of charis which is similar to both the
charis of beauty and the charis of an erotic relationship. Furthermore, by
introducing eros, Socrates attempts to draw Callicles' attention to a particular
kind of desire arid invites him to think about what charis could mean in
coimection with a desire for sophia. In other words, Callicles had previously
spoken in terms of brute desire, epithumia. Socrates now tries to shift the focus
to eros. Somehow, Socrates suggests, philosophy has the charis of that young
man you are enamored of.
Callicles answers Socrates with an extended speech, by far the longest
example of rhetoric in the Gorgias except for Socrates' concluding muthos of
judgment. Callicles begins by charging that Polus and Gorgias were shamed into
making admissions that they did not really mean (482c5-e7). To suffer injustice —
to allow someone to wrong you or to insult you —is by nature (phusis) always
shameful, and what is shameful is always evil. It is only by convention (nomos)
that doing evil is more shameful (483a7-9). It would be better to be dead than to
not be able to protect (boetheo) oneself or those one cares for, which is the lot of a
slave (483a9-b4). Nomoi, laws or convention, are made by the masses, who are
weak or inferior, in order to hold down those who are stronger and more
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superior by nature (phusis), and who would dominate if given free rein (483b4-
c5). To illustrate this point about natural behavior, Callicles appeals to the
natural world, where, he says, the strongest always dominate (483dl-9). To
support this claim he appeals to a fable in which the naturally strong men are
compared to young lions taken from nature and kept confined. As the lions are
subdued by their captivity, so the strong men are subdued by the "spells and
witchcraft" of laws until an exceptionally strong one breaks free, disdaining man-
made laws and asserting his natural dominance (483e6-484bl).
It is not certain from what source Callicles (and Plato) draw this analogy of
human beings to lions raised in captivity, but both Dodds (268) and Fraenkel
(342) recognize that the same image was used by Aeschylus in the Agamemnon
to refer to Helen of Troy. It is worthwhile looking at the fable as it occurs in the
Agamemnon because it not only helps illuminate the character of Callicles but
also reinforces the claims about charis that have been made to this point. There
is no guarantee, of course, that Callicles (or Plato)was referring to the play by
Aeschylus and not to the underlying fable itself, which was well-known in
classical times (Dodds 268-269, Fraenkel 342); nevertheless, I think it is fair to
assume that Greek audiences could have made this connection straight away.
The relevant passage is Agamemnon 717-735, which I quote in full:
So, once, was a lion's offspring reared by a man in his house, getting
no milk from its mother, still fond of the teat, in the prelude of its
life tame, a good friend of the children (euphilopais) and a delight
to the elders; and many a time it was in their arms, like a nursling
child, looking bright-eyed to the hand and fawning under the
constraint of its belly. But matured by time it showed the character
it had from its parents: for, making a return (charis) to those who
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had reared it, it made ready a feast as an unbidden guest in a horrid
slaughter of the flock, and the house was befouled with blood—to
the house-folk an agony not to be warded off, a vast havoc wherein
manywere killed; by the will of the god it had been reared in the
house to be a sacrificer in the service of Ate.^^
In this fable, a lion cub, which in its youth was full of charts —charming and
friendly to its foster family —shows its true nature when older by slaughtering
both the flocks and the peoplewho raised it. As in many contemporary cultures,
the Greeks believed that the reciprocal bonds of parent-child philia demanded
that the child give charis —repa5niient, gratitude—to his or her parents (or foster
parents) in return for nurture and care (Blundell 41-42). In the fable, the lion
returns the charis of its adopted family by violating the reciprocal bonds of
caregiving. In the Agamemon. the reference is to Helen of Troy, a woman
possessed of the charis ofgreat beauty, whose abduction brings destruction to the
Trojans, her "adopted" family (MacLachlan 128-129).
When Gallicles uses the lion analogy, it is not clear how far he intends to
take it. It is important to note that Callicles professes to recognize some forms of
social obligation. He claims, for instance, that a strong, free man will be able to
protect himself "or anyone else for whomhe cares (kedetes)" (483b). This phrase
is ambiguous. For whom does Callicles care? SinceCallicles appeals to nature,
perhaps he cares for "natural" family members such as parents, children, perhaps
even his eromenos, since this relationship is based on a "natural" erotic impulse.
But what of other relationships —wife, in-laws, friends? Are these natural?
Perhaps. Given Callicles' disdain of community law, however, it appears certain
57Eduard Fraenkel's text and translation.
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that dvil philia is on shaky ground in Callicles' moral universe.^ Bycastingoff
nomos, Callicles is willing to set aside the conventions and laws of the polis, the
"adopted familjr" of citizens who have raised him. He repudiates any charts he
might owe to the community. Yet the fable leaves us wondering if, in matters of
philia, it is often difficult to distinguish the natural from the conventional. The
lion image is deeply troubling.
Callicles further responds to Socrates' himiorous critique of his political
behavior by returning the favor and criticizing philosophy. Socrates has subtly
suggested a connection between philosophy and charis, and Callicles cleverly
turns Socrates' notion against him. According to Callicles, philosophy does
produce a sort of charis. In yoimg boys, saysCallicles, philosophy is charieis —a
charming thing, full of charis ~ if done in moderation. But grown men should
concentrate on greater things (484c5-8). Too much philosophy leads to the
corruption (diaphthora) of men (484c8-10) because they remain ignorant of the
ways of human beings —ignorant of their laws, of their ways of reaching
agreement, of their pleasures and desires (484cl0-d8).5^ Philosophy should be
imdertaken only to "gratify" one's educational needs (paideia charin) (485a5).^
It is like the "pretty" (charieis) lisping of a child, in which one delights (485b4).
However, the sight of an old man like Socrates philosophizing is not pleasing
but ridiculous (katagelastos) (485a7-8). Even worse, it is slavish and deserves a
whipping (485b9-c2). Philosophy will make even the most promising young
Contrary to somemterpretations, Callicles is not amoral. He has a codeof behavior. Oneof
Socrates' tasks is to tease out both the implications and the inconsistencies of this code.
®^The word diaphthora at 484c9 is verystrong. It means rape, destruction, ruin, death,or corruption
in a moral sense. One of the chargesagainst^crates was that he corrupted the youth of Athens,
^^^e accusative singular of charis functions here as a preposition with the general meaning "for
the sake of." When so used, says MacLachlan, charin "retains little of the original semantic color
of the word" (161). However, given tiie prominence of charis in Socrates' and Callicles' reciprocal
critiques, this use of charin seems to retain much of the semantic "concreteness" of tiie original
meaning. See MacLachlan 161-164 for a discussion of the prepositional use of charis.
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man "unmanly" (485d4-6). In tiiis part of his speech, Callicles tries to make of
Socrates a comic figiare who whispers in a comer with boys and who would be
mute when required to defend himself in court (485d8-el; 486a8^b4). He has, in
fact, called Socrates no better than a slave, probably one of the most insulting
things one could say to a Greek male citizen.6^ Socrates' situation is
"disgraceful" (aischros) because he will be as powerless as any slave to save
himself should someone haul him into court unjustly. He will be unable to
succor (boethed) himself or to save (eksdzd) himself or others from danger
(486b6-c2).
Callides' and Socrates' criticisms of each other are reciprocal, very similar
to one another on the face of things. Socrates criticizes rhetoric and rhetoricians
as ethically deficient because they aim only at the pleasant, not the good, and they
fail to improve the souls of the audience; Callicles thinks that philosophy is
dangerous because it corrupts a man's phusis, making even the best man
vmmanly. Socrates says that rhetoricians lack nous, intelligence; Callicles retorts
that Socrates lacks practical wisdom, to phronein. Socrates accuses rhetoric of
producing charis; Callicles criticizes philosophy for producing only certain kinds
of charis. In other words, philosophy produces charis in others only when
practiced by young boys; in this it resembles the charis of beauty, and is
appropriate. But when practiced by older men, it fails to produce the practical
charis expected of a real man, who gives aid and comfort to his friends, and who
thwarts the actions of any enemies who do him wrong. Taken as a whole, these
criticisms constitute the main arguments which have for centuries shaped the
debate between the "active life," and the "contemplative life."
^^Other things are to infantilize or feminize him, both ofwhich Callicles has implied here. The
attempt to identify one's opponent with the politicallypowerless is unfortunately still a common
tactic in modem discotirse. Note that Socrates is not immune to this behavior.
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Socrates spends the next part of the discussion trying to pin Calllcles down
about what he means by those who are "superior." It is the stronger? Yes, says
Callicles. But on this view, replies Socrates, then the masses, who are naturally
stronger than the single individual, would be superior. Callicles accuses Socrates
of catching at words. Of course I mean, he says, that the superior persons are the
better persons (to beltious). But Socrates again stops him: what does he mean by
the better sort of people? Is it the wiser? Of course, says Callicles. Then the wiser
should rule and have more than the baser sort? Yes. Well, then, the wiser at
what? At health? Then the doctor shall be wiser and he shall rule and have
more food... . Socrates continues in this vein until he drives Callicles to admit
that when he says "the superior," he means those who have political skills
(488bll-491b6).
At this, Socrates abruptly shifts gears to a discussion of temperance:
Should one be able to rule oneself? Callicles says emphatically that to be
temperate is to be slavish. Justice and fairness, according to nature, is to let one's
desires (epithumia) be as strong as possible and to satisfy every desire to the
utmost Those who believe in temperance do so only because they are unable
through their weakness to secure their own advantage. Luxury and
licentiousness and freedom are virtue and happiness. All else is unnatural
(491d7-492c9). If Callicles really believes that natural justice consists in gratifjdng
any pleasure, however, then he should approve this behavior not oiUy for
himself but for others as well. But Socrates uses increasingly outrageous
examples of gratification —beginning with scratching and ending with the
passive homosexual prostitute, one of the most vilified characters in Greek
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society —in order to drive Callicles to admit that he does not approve of all types
of gratification piirsued by everyone (492d6-494e9).^
It becomes more and more clear that satisfying his own desires is the
ultimate goal for Callicles. By appealing to phusis and rejecting nomos, Callicles
apparently attempts to grotmd morality in something outside of one
commuiuty's laws; in his original argument, he appealed to the animal kingdom
as well as to other human societies besides Athens. On the surface of things,
such an appeal regulates human conduct by something that is foundational. As
Betts argues, "to downgrade existing norms by comparison with some supposed
natural standard of right —whatever that natural standard might be ~ is precisely
to reject relativism about values; it is to set up an objective, neutral criterion by
which existing norms can all be weighed on a common scale" (163, emphasis
his). But Callicles' focus on the gratification of his own desires, as opposed to
desires he does not personally approve of, calls the neutrality of his moral
foundation into question —at the very least, it makes his 0"v\m motives suspect.
As Blundell says in a related context, an appeal to such a superficially neutral
code of behavior "conflates the legitimate pursuit of a neutrally desirable end
with the indulgence of personal passion" (267), Blundell also remarks that this
kind of false neutrality in one's moral code can lead to inconsistency in
application (267), and we see this kind of inconsistency working in Callicles'
rejection of his former position that all gratification of desire is good. Socrates
finally prods Callicles into admitting that pleasure and the good are not
synonymous, that he believes some pleasures to be better than others, that some
pleasures and pains are good and some bad (499b5-dl3).
^AfterSocrates offers the example ofthe male prostitute, Callicles begins to break the "rules" of
dialectic by giving answers designed only to »ve himself from inconsistency. I will take up this
issue in a later section.
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Socrates then asks if professional skill is necessary to tell the good
pleasures from the bad ones (to which Callicles assents), and this leads back to a
discussion of rhetoric and a recap of Socrates' discussion with Polus about
cookery versus medicine and so forth (500a7-503d4).^ According to Socrates'
techne-analogy, all true craftspeople endeavor to create a certain form in their
products. It is this regularity and order which make the products good. This is
what trainers and doctors do with the body, creating health and strength.
Analogously, the same applies to the soul. A good soul has regularity (taxis) and
order (kosmos). If an orator has a true art and is good, he will endeavor to create
regularity and order in the souls of the audience —and these states are the same
as justice (dike) and temperance (sophrosune) (503d6-504d5). This soulcraft is to
be the goal of the orators in word and deed:
and in giving any gift he will give it, and in taking anything away
he will take it, with this thought always before his mind ~ how
justice may be engendered in the souls of his fellow-dtizens, and
how injustice may be removed. (504d9-e3)
Charts is involved here in two ways. First, the good orator engenders order
(kosmos), which is the same as temperance (sophrosune), in the soul. The word
kosmos has several meanings in Greek, but two of the most important are
"order" and "ornament or embellishment" (L&S 446). As Irwin remarks, the use
of this word may suggest that the order of temperance —the capacity to order
^^This time, Socrates includes in the class ofc/iaris-produdng flatteries flute-playing, choral
productions, dithyrambic compositions, haip playing, and tragedy. In an echo of Gorgias' comment
in the Helen that poetiy is speech with meter, ^crates says that sp^hes are "the leavings" (to
leipommon) of poetry when stripped of melody and rhythm and meter. Poetry is therefore a
species ofrhetoric because poet^ isessentially a kind ofpublic speaking. Hence, poetry isalso
flattery (501dl-502d9). Orators are like the poets, who are set on gratifying the citizens, not
attempting to improve them; for the sake of flieir private interests, they take little heed of the
common good (502dll-ell).
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one's soul and keep one's desires in check—has something like the
attractiveness of jewelry or cosmetics, those same producers of false charis which
Socrates rebuked at 465bl-8 (214-215). I agree with Irwin that this association is
important. Previously, in his discussionwith Polus, Socrates contrasted the
beauty of cosmetics, a charis that is allotrios or foreign, with a charis that is
brought about by gymnastics ~ one that is oikeios, one's own (465b7). Here, with
respect to the soul, is that kind of "inner" c/wn's-beauty —the order and self-
control of sophrosune. Again, associating sophrosunS with attractiveness is not
a new idea in Greek culture ~ and those who possess sophrosune, like the
"good" oratory which imparts it (503a4-bl), are kalos, noble or adinirable;
Moreover, sophrosune, like the charis of beauty, enables social
relationships. In order to be philos to someone, one must be able —not always,
but sometimes —to treat that person's interests as primary. This often requires
temperance. If we, like Callicles, consider justice to be the satisfaction of our
desires to the utmost degree, then we are bound to come into conflict with the
desires of others. Philia then requires that we restrain ourselves if we are to
avoid interminable conflict. As Blundell says, sophrosuni is "the self-discipline
which, amongst other things, enables one to place the desires of a philos above
one's own" (61). This seems to be the reasoning behind Socrates' assertion that
the licentious can have no true friendship, since they have no power (adunatos)
to share or to hold anything in common (koindneo) with either gods or other
men. Since friendship depends on community (koindnia), on sharing things in
common, sophrosune is itself a power, the power to share with another. Where
Callicles thinks that rhetoric will give him the power to satisfy his desires,
Socrates implies that for all his rhetorical skills he will lack power —the power of
sophrosune and, hence, the power to form friendships, one of the very things
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Callicles accepts as part of the life of the "manly" citizen (Irwin225). Indeed,
concludes Socrates, the entire kosmos, according to "wise men" rests on such
community, and on orderliness, temperance and justice (507e7-508a5).
This is not to say that one should encourage any and all desires of a friend.
This point, on which Socrates is perfectly clear, was not an unusual one in Greek
culture. But for Socrates, himian beings naturally wish (boulomai) what is just
and good —this was the point of the 'Tolus" argument. There is no problem for
Socrates to say that a human being always promotes a friend's desires, if desire is
properly understood. In giving there is charis and the ultimate charis is justice
and temperance. This is what the rhetor ought to provide to the citizens., and
what the teacher should provide to a student In this way, the relationship
between rhetor and audience, or rhetorician and student, should resemble the
friendly relationships Socrates spoke of with Polus. The role of the orator or the
teacher is like the role of the personal friend, who in correcting wrong opinions
becomes a great benefactor (euergetis) (506cl-3).
Socrates now reviews Callicles' accusations against him. Socrates is
supposed by Callicles to be unable to defend himself or his loved ones against
injustice (508c6-d6). This seems a reasonable criticism. What is wrong with
defending oneself against injustice? Socrates and Callicles agree that one would
have to equip oneself with some power (dunamis) in order to avoid being
wronged (509d2-6). Callicles is clearly thinking of rhetoric and political power.
Socrates argues that in order to avoid being wronged one must make oneself
either a despot or a ruler or an ally of the existing political regime. To this,
Callicles enthusiastically agrees (510a8-b3); this is his ambition, to attain the
political power that will allow him to act as he likes. But Socrates will go on to
show that Callicles' ambitions —to be politically powerful and to avoid being
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wronged—are at odds with other beliefs that he holds dear, namely, his beliefin
the value of friendships and his belief in his own superiority over the masses.
Socrates begins with the premise that the closest possible friendship is that
between "like and like" (510b5). This is a commonplace of ancient Greek culture,
an assumption that those who share many things in common, as brothers do,
would be the best friends. Callicles accepts this premise.^ According to Socrates,
however, a tyrant will be friendly with neither those much better than himself
(because he will fear them) nor those much inferior (because he will despise
them). Only one who is of the same moral character as the tyrant will be a friend
to, have the same attitudes and beliefs as, and be willing to be ruled by the tyrant.
So to be assured of not being wronged, one must strive to be philos to those who
are in control, which in this case will mean becoming as like the other as possible
(510b9-510d2). But being like the t5Tant will cause a person to do much wrong -
since the tyrant does wrong with imptmity —and to try to avoid pa3^g the
penalty, the two most egregious moral wrongs, according to Socrates. Political
power will mean corrupting the soul (510e5-511a3).
In this argtiment, Socrates does not intend the 'like to like" commonplace
to serve as a definition of friendship in general; rather, Socrates uses the
common belief of "Uke to like," with which Callicles agrees, to try to force
Callicles into the admission that in order to have power in the city, he must
become like, not merely imitate, the people he pretends to love but merely has
contempt for ~ the many (512e6-513b9). Although Socrates uses the word
"tyrant" in most of this argument, he clearly states in the beginning that he
^^Tliat Socrates introducesthis premise does notmean that Socrates himself necessarily accepts it,
but he might. In the Lysis>"like to like" is examined and dismissed as a definition of friendship.
But, again, Socrates is not seeking a definition of friendship in this dialogue; he seeks to expose
inconsistencies in Callicles' belief system.
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includes any sort of political regime (510a8-10). In the democracy of Athens, the
masses are in charge of the existing political regime, at least in theory (and
Socrates seems to agree here that this is the case). In other words, in order for
Callicles to have great power in the state as it exists, he must become like the
very people he despises. On the other hand, using rhetoric to defend ourselves
against the actions of wrongdoers, continues Socrates, is of the most supreme
value only if we value our lives above all else (511b8-c2, 512d8-e6). But if
rhetoric is used merely to prolong one's life, then it is not the status-filled
occupation that Callicles thinks; for other men save people's lives —men such as
navigators and engineers —but in return they charge only a small fee and do not
put on airs since they do not know if they have benefited or harmed the souls of
their customers by their actions. They recognize the moral neutrality of their
respective technat Yet Callicles despises such people as being inferior to himself
(511c7-512d8).
Socrates returns to the techni analogy: If we were builders, wouldn't we
first examine ourselves to make sure we understood the art of building and had
learned it from a reputable source? (514a5-b4). And would we not see if we had
already built a good building in private before we presumed to build a public
building, and so with the other arts? (514b5-el2). If the object of a political career
is to make the citizens better (so Socrates argues), then we should also examine
our private behavior to see if we have ever made another person better (515al-5).
Socrates is quite strident here and issues a direct challenge to Callicles: How has
Callicles been a true friend to anyone in private by making that person better?
(515a8-b5). Indeed, Socrates continues, the rhetors of the past, like Pericles, have
not made the public better (515c6-516a3). Like a herdsman who fails in his job by
taking tame (hemeros) animals and making them wild (agrios), the politician
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who does not tame or civilize the people —that is, make them more just ~ is not
a good rhetor (516a5-d7). This argument of Socrates' is most offensive to our
modern sensibilities, relying as it does on an analogy of human beings to
domestic animals. But it can be seen as a reply to the fable of the lion which
Callicles used to support his idea that the strong man should assert his nature
against nomos, like a wild animal in captivity who turns on its adopted family.
In Aeschylus' version, when the lion is young, he is tame (hameros) and philos
to the children of the house (721).^ 'Tame," in this sense of the word, is to be
civilized, that is, to tame one's appetites in order that one may live with others
and be philos to them. At least, this is one implication.
Socrates' real point in making the analogy, however, seems to be that
citizens should never turn on their leaders, regardless of either the leaders'
moral characters or their skills in rhetoric. A truly good and just leader would
never be thrown out since he would be able to make the citizens just, and a good
speaker (a good flatterer, according to Socrates) would be able to gratify the
populace indefinitely and so would be kept on (see Irwin on this point, 235-6)
(516d8-517a7). In any case, Socrates finds it ironic that politicians claim to be
unjustiy treated after all of their valuable service to the people and the state.
They fail to recognize that while they have given the people what they want,
they have not made the citizens more just and so cannot expect just treatment.
Socrates believes this parallels the behavior of the sophists, who claimed to teach
arete, or excellence:
The sophists, in fact> with all their other accomplishments, act
absurdly in one point: claiming to be teachers of virtue, they often
accuse their pupils of doing them an injury by cheating them of
^Hameros is the Doric form of hemeros.
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their fees and otherwise showing no recognition of the good (charis)
they have done them. (519c4-dl)
If the sophists truly taught arete —since, in Socrates' view, they would have
knowledge of it —they would have no need to accuse their students of injustice.
Socrates argues that only true or just rhetors and sophists are guaranteed a just
reward (charis) ; other teachers have no such assurance. A gymnastic master, for
example, teaches us to run fast, not to be just. Since he does not teach justice,
there is no objection to his charging a fee as a charis for his good service .
(euergesia) (520c2-d3).^ But in the case of those who claim to have a techne of
excellence, who claim to teach others how to be superior and how to manage
personal and public affairs for the best, it is considered disgraceful to give advice
for pay,
the reason evidently being that this is the only sort of good
deed(euergesia) that makes the person so served desire to do one in
return; and hence it is felt to be a good sign when this service that
one has done is repaid to one in kind; but when this is not so, the
contrary is felt. (520e8-13)
This criticism of teachers who take money for their services is perhaps in need of
clarification since the objection is often puzzling for modem readers. According
to Hands, there certainly was an upper-class prejudice against transactions that
were sales for money since it implied that "the recipient was the employee of the
other party, that he needed to accept such for his living, and was not a man of
quality at all" (33). Himt, too, speculates that the Socratic/PIatonic objection to
taking fees is rooted in the feeling that taking fees "made the teacher seem to be a
^For thehistorical Gorgias, too, who apparently claimed not to teach justice and virtue, this
would be consistent.
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servant of the pupil" (18). But Socrates' criticism in the Gorgias seems more
concerned with the moral corruption of a student-teacher relationship which is
transient and not based on philia. This attitude is best explained by Gabriel
Herman, who writes in the context of ritualized friendships (xenia):
Outside the context of friendship —in trading relationships, for
example ~ the exchange is a short-term, self-liquidating transaction.
Once the benefits are obtained, the social relationship is terminated.
The transaction does not create moral involvement. By contrast,
within the framework of amiable relations (kinship, friendship,
ritualized friendship), exchanges have a long-term expectancy. Gifts
beg coimter-gifts, and fulfill at one and the same time a niimber of
purposes: they repay past services, incur new obligations, and act as
continuous reminders of the validity of the bond. (80, emphasis
mine)
While not explicitly stated, this is the language of charis: the good deed done
prompts the receiver to return in kind, creating and sustaining the moral
framework in which philia thrives. This is the point of Socrates' criticism of the
teaching of rhetoric: the exchange "rhetoric for money" does not create a moral
obligation between teacher and student. And it is this same lack of a moral
framework to which Plato's Gorgias is imwilling to admit, but which creates
morally confused products like Polus. Rhetoric, as currently taught by sophists,
is a charis which is not a charis, since it is powerless to guarantee a just return. It
must be bought and sold like any commodity since it cannot trust getting back
what it claims to impart, virtue and justice.
Socrates extends this same criticism to politics. The leaders of the dty
protest that they have done many good things for the state but are nevertheless
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prosecuted for wrongdoing (519b2-10). Their charts, however, consists of walls,
ships, and armaments (519al-4), "favors" which cannot be returned with justice,
for the souls of the citizens have not been made temperate or just. In a
remarkable statement, Socrates says he is perhaps the only man in Athens to
attempt (epicheireo) a true political techne, since anytime he makes a speech the
object is not charis (in the bad sense) but what is the best (521d6-5). That Socrates
shoiild call himself a statesman is not so strange a statement as it might seem at
first. Socrates' charis is small-scale, in the sense that it primarily benefits one
soul at a time. But according to Dover, "The Athenians did not draw a clear
distinction between generosity to the commimity, channeled through the
machinery of state, and charity to individuals" (GPM177). One of Socrates'
purposes in the Gorgias has been to show that public friendship and private
friendship are very similar. Socrates' difference is that his charis is not in the
form of material goods or entertainments. Because he has no material charis to
point to, Socrates predicts that he will be put to death if he is brought into court,
since he will "have no pleasures to plead as having been provided by me —
which they reg^d as services (euergesia) and benefits (dpheleia)" (522b3-6).
In Socrates' conversation with Callicles, then, the relationship between
orator and audience, as Socrates presents it, is mutually corrupting of citizen and
politician alike. Where Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles see rhetoric as a path to
power, Socrates repeatedly emphasizes the power the audience has over the
speaker, forcing the orator to mold his opinions to fit those of the people he
purports to lead. The citizens, for their part, are given no true benefit from those
leaders; that is, their souls are not made more just, and, as a result, they turn on
their leaders and ostracize them. At least one interpretation of Gorgias' extant
works has portrayed Gorgias' view of rhetoric as one-sided. In other words, to
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borrow Thomas M. Conle3r's description, Gorgias views rhetoric as "a imilateral
transaction between an active speaker and a passive audience" in which the
speaker wields most of the power in the relationship (6). While this is only one
possible interpretation of Gorgian rhetoric, it is consistent both with the
criticisms of rhetoric that Socrates makes in this dialogue and with Plato's
portrayal of "rhetorical" characters. Gorgias, Polus, and Callides, who all focus
on the rhetor's power as the primary benefit of rhetoric, do not seem to consider
how their own souls are affected by the exchange. Socrates tries to convince
them that they, too, are potentially changed by the act of spealang to an audience.
Indeed, the emphasis on charis in Plato's Gorgias indicates that, for Socrates, and
probably for Plato as well, oral human commimication is rarely, if ever, one
sided; there is always an exchange in oral human discourse, a reciprocal exchange
which has the potential for either moral benefit or moral corruption.
In the closing passages of the Gorgias, Socrates makes an explicit invitation
to Callides, and to all others, to join him in a life of inqmry into the truth (526d4-
e5). On the face of things, it is strange that Socrates would extend such an
invitation to a man like Callides, who seems so opposed to and so incompatible
with Socrates' sort of life. Yet we have noted an important similarity between
Socrates and Callides, which Socrates himself has pointed out: they are both men
of Erds, possessed of a strong desire which borders on madness. Although the
object of Callides' desires are different from Socrates', Callides' strong erds for
public recognition shows that he has the philosopher's capadty to enter into an
erotic relationship with something larger than a single hiiman being. Socrates'
arguments have been designed to show him a different object for his desire. This
object, as I have tried to show, is the beauty of justice and sophrosune, which
shines with a charis that is oikeios, one's own, and yet is akin to us all. Socrates
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does not seek to destroy Callicles' desire; he does seek to redirect it As David
Roochnik puts it, "Socrates attempts to reform Callicles by offering him a vision
of an orderly and knowable whole. In other words, Socrates follows the advice
that Aristotle later will give: the only effective cure for the man of t3Tannical
desires is philosophy" ("Coimting" 557)^7
Socrates therefore offers Callicles a particular, and peculiar, kind of
friendship, becoming philos to wisdom. This final invitation continues the offer
of friendship inherent in his repeated challenges to Gorgias, to Polus, and to
Callicles to refute and be refuted, to question and be questioned. To be refuted,
the paradoxical charis of Socrates' elenchus, is an act of the highest friendship
whereby, to use Socrates' medical analogy, the soul is cured of sickness. Since to
share in such activities is to engage in philosophy (however imperfectly or
clumsily), the questions and answers function like the gifts given and received in
ordinary friendships. If I may borrow again the words of Gabriel Herman quoted
earlier and apply them in a slightly different context, the gifts of questions and
answers "repay past services, incur new obligations, and act as continuous
reminders of the validity of the bond" the philosopher shares with both the
interlocutors and the object of their mutual desire. Since gift-giving> both
private and public/ was, like so many other activities, a sort of contest for the
Greeks (Hands 26-27), Socrates expresses this mutual give and take in agonistic
terms. We should strive with each other, he says, to find out the truth of the
matters under discussion, for, if found, it would be a good common to all (505e).
He invites Callicles and others to this philosophical contest (526e), using the
same verb (parakald) used to call one's friends to witness at law.
Aristotle, Politics 1267al0-16.
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Any gift or any offer of friendship may be refused, however, and this is
what happens to Socrates. As Howard J. Curzer remarks, 'Thilosophic
friendships are based upon cooperation in the pursuit of truth and are ruined
when one or both of the friends is unwilling to abandon false beliefs in order to
continue the elenchus" (158). In the end, none of the assembled company is
even willing to enter into dialogue with Socrates ~ they only wish to hear him
talk to see what he will say (505d8-506c4). Callicles, especially, refuses Socrates'
offer by refusing to participate in question and answer. At one point in the
discussion of pleasure and gratification, Callicles starts violating the "rules" of
dialectic by answering not with what he truly believes but only with those
emswers that will keep him from 'losing" the argument. In other words, his
answers are designed only to save himself from inconsistency (495a6-7). He tries
some avoidance tactics, claiming an inability to follow Socrates' "sophistics" and
professing ignorance of Socrates' meaning (497a7-b4). Finally, Callicles agrees to
answer but protests that he does so merely to give charis to Gorgias (501c9-10).
Thus, Callicles rejects Socrates' offer of a philosophical friendship based on the
unpleasant charis of refutation for a more traditional friendship based on the
pleasurable but worthless charis of gratification.
Indeed, several scholars have remarked on Socrates' failure to convince
any of his interlocutors of the rightness of his position (Kastely 97-98; Kennedy
36; Nightingale). In fact, Charles Kauffman argues that Socrates fails as
dialectician, as rhetorician, and as statesman since he has also failed to make his
interlocutors more just (116-125). Surely part of this failure, as Socrates himself
is aware, is due to the rigorous and unpleasant nature of tiie elenchus. Instead of
the softening effect of rhetorical pleasure, which produces aidds and persuasion,
the elenchus seems to produce the opposite effect. Polus and Gorgias are
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"shamed," and Callides, who claims no conventional shame, becomes angry.
Indeed, the conversations in tiie Gorgias often show a remarkable lack of
conventional charis-pleasure, the kind of good feeling present at the feast or the
symposium. In particular, Socrates' exchange with Callicles, as Guthrie notes, is
marked by "unmistakable bitterness and ill-temper" (107). While I would not go
quite so far as Guthrie, I do agree that the dialogue becomes progressively bitter
in tone. Kauffman argues that Plato uses Socrates' failure as a criticism of both
rhetoric ^d dialectic, which he (Plato) regards as "complementary arts" (126).
Moreover, Kauffman argues that the dialogue form "is itself an example of the
skillful use of rhetoric and, as such, illustrates the proper use of rhetoric (126-
127). I do not really disagree with Kauffman's conclusions, for I think —although
I carmot prove here —that Plato believes rhetoric to be an inescapable part of
human communication and intends his dialogues to be examples of good
rhetoric. Does this mean, however, that Plato created his dialogues to be an
antidote to both rhetoric and dialectic, both beneficial to the soul and pleasurable
in the conventional sense, combing the best charis of both worlds, so to speak?
This is a difficult question. Certainly many Platonic dialogues are delightful, and
they seem filled with charis^ not only for the characters but also for us readers.
The Phaedrus and the Symposium come readily to mind. However, in order to
benefit from a Platonic dialogue -- indeed, from any dialogue —one must
participate. As Jacob Klein says, one must become part of the dialogue, ask
ourselves the questions that Socrates asks, attempt some answers, criticize those
answers (5-9). I can attest that this is not always pleasant. As to the charis of
benefit, I would submit that the Gorgias, as a commentary on the pitfalls of
human communication, may also suggest that we revise our conceptions of
success and failure. Perhaps it is true that Socrates "fails" to persuade his
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interlocutors and, hence, to make their souls more just. But in real-life
rhetorical situations, too, complete victory is a rarity and utter failure all too
common. As Socrates says to Callicles, we often need "to examine these same
questions more than once, and better" in order to persuade others or to decide
what we ourselves believe (513c9-d2). As a commentary on philosophy, then,
the Gorgias may suggest that the attempt is as important as the result, the
question as iniportant as the answer.
There are many questions which go unanswered in the Gorgias, and many
answers which are suggested but not discussed in detail. For example, although
Socrates has suggested that a "good" rhetoric might exist, we know little about it
except the requirements that it must proceed with knowledge and aim always at
justice and the good. But a conventional notion of justice —helping friends and
harming enemies —is itself questioned in this dialogue. What does it mean to
help a friend or harm an enemy? Is this notion of justice even tenable? What is
the nature of friendship and of the philosophical friendship in particular? How
c^ we be philos to both wisdom and to each other? What are the connections
between eros and philosophy? All of these questions, however, are considered
in more depth in other dialogues —Phaedrus, Republic, Lysis,Symposium.
We saw in Chapter Three that the fifth-century B.C.E. was a time of change
for the concept of charis in Greek culture. Cut loose from its moorings in the
divine, charis became a problematic concept, filled with contradiction and
uncertainty. This uncertainty was given voice by playwrights such as Aeschylus,
who split the charis of pleasure from the charis of benefit. Plato's Socrates
exploits this paradox as well, incorporating it into the Gorgias as commentary on
rhetoric and dialectic. At the end of the dialogue, however, Socrates attempts to
stabilize the concept In her discussion of charis, Bonnie MacLachlan notes that
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the charts that flows between human beings is transitory and unstable. Human
beauty, like all of human life, is fleeting; we are ephemeroi, creatures of a day.
Death removes us from any human communion and, according to MacLachlan,
"social interchange is no longer possible: Charis cannot operate" (148-149). Thus,
the charis that Callicles seeks through rhetoric and power and pleasure is
ephemeral as well. But in the closing myth of the afterlife, Socrates points
towards a charis that abides. In the final courtroom, each soul is judged, stripped
of its body and the trappings of physical charis (523c9-524a8). Temperance and
justice and virtue finally receive their due, and the soul is awarded a divine
charis in the Isles of the Blessed, the paradise reserved for heroes (526c2-526c7).
Charis is once again groimded in the eternal. The grounding of charis is
mythical, however, and is not justified in the Gorgias by any explicit
metaphysics. But suggestions are here, and they point the way to the erotic
dialogues, the Svmposium and, especially, the Phaedrus, where the charis
lighting a loved one's eyes is revealed as the charis of Beauty itself, shining in
eternal splendor.
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APPENDIX A. INDEXTO CHARIS AND PHILIA IN THE GORGIAS
charts, char-
458d5,462c8,462cl0,462d5,462d6,462el, 465d3,470c8,484c7,485a5,485b4,501b9,
SOlclO, 501d4,502al, 502al0,502b4,502cl, 502e9,505c7,516b4,516b5,520c6,521a5,
521d9
philia, philos
447b3,456d5,456d6,456dl0,466cl0*, 470cl0,471a3*, 473a3,479c3,479dlO% 480c3,
482a6*, 485e2,486a4*, 487e7,492c2,497d6,499c4,5d0b7,507e4-5,507e6,508a2,508c9,
509b9,510b5,510c2,510c6,510c9,513b6,513c3* 515b7,519e3
* indicates a term of address in the vocative case, phile or phile
philosophia, philosophed, and other compounds of phil-
457d5,481d6,482bl, 484c6,484cll, 485a5,485a6,485a8,485bl, 485c3,485c4,485c7,
485d2,486a7,487c8,500c8,505e5,514b6,515b6,515e9
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APPENDIX B. SUMMARYOF SOCRATES' ARGUMENTAT 474D3-475E8*
Polus' view is that suffering wrong is more evil or harmful (kakos) than
doing wrong, but that doing wrong is more shameful (aischros). He believes that
kalos is not the same as agathos, nor kakos the same as aischros (474c4-d2).
Richard McKim simimarizes Socrates' refutation as follows (Polus has already
professed to believe both HT and ST):
(HT) Suffering injustice is more harmful to the sufferer than committing it is to
the agent.
(ST) Committing injustice is more shameful than suffering it.
(A) Whatever is admirable (kalon) is so on account of being either pleasant
(hedu) or beneficial (chresimon, ophelimon) or both (474d3-475a4).
(B) The opposite of admirable is shameful (aischron),and the opposites of
pleasant and beneficial are painful (luperon) and harmful (kakon) (475a4-
5).
(C) Therefore, whatever is shameful is so on account of being either painful
or harmful (475 a5-b2).
(D) But committing injustice is certainly not more painful than suffering it
(475b3-c4).
(E) Therefore, since it is more shaiheful by ST, it must be so on accotmt of
being more harmful, contrary to HT (475c4-9).
(F) Therefore, nobody would prefer to commit injustice rather than suffer it
(475dl-e6)
* This summary is taken from the dted work by Richard McKim, pages 43-44.
HT and ST are McKim's terms.
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